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ABSTRACT 
As the fastest-growing urban area in the United States—and due to 
its emerging national influence in commercial real estate development and 
leasing through transformational transactions such as Amazon’s recently 
completed national HQ2 search—the City of Seattle and related 
Washington State laws addressing the use of dual agency in commercial 
transactions present a unique backdrop for examining the findings and 
recommendations from a 2014 commercial real estate conflicts of interest 
research study and attendant report, described below, more than four years 
after its publication. 
In November 2014, a published research study report made a number 
of key observations about the existence of adverse legal and transactional 
consequences from conflicts of interest in the representation of 
commercial tenants by full-service brokerage firms engaged in the 
commercial real estate services (CRES) sector actively engaged in the 
practice of “dual agency.” That report, published by the Center for Real 
Estate and Urban Analysis (CREUA) at The George Washington 
University School of Business in Washington, D.C., also offered a series 
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of key recommendations for mitigating or eliminating entirely these 
adverse consequences.1 
In the intervening years since the mid-November 2014 publication 
of the conflicts of interest research report, the CRES sector has not taken 
any steps, in the form of industry self-regulation or otherwise, to address—
much less ameliorate—these legal issues and the attendant, adverse 
transactional consequences for commercial tenants. Further, over the same 
period, (1) there has been increasing consolidation among the five largest 
CRES full-service brokerage firms (i.e., collectively they represent a 
larger share of the market for leasing commercial property than in 2014, 
when the CREUA conflicts of interest research report was conducted); and 
(2) those firms have gained traction in numerous domestic commercial 
property markets by taking equity positions in a substantial amount of 
commercial space available for lease in major markets.2 
These market developments further exacerbate the negative 
consequences for tenants seeking independent, objective, and professional 
representation in commercial real estate transactions because they present 
the prospect that, in a dual agency scenario, the tenant representative may 
be acting as an undisclosed principal.3 And even in cases where the tenant 
representative discloses the existence of a conflict where their firm is a 
principal in the transaction, the tenant may not be adequately equipped 
with the knowledge necessary to understand the significance and 
consequence of the self-dealing present in this transaction. 
As a consequence, the problems associated with dual agency have 
become more acute and more pervasive in the world of commercial real 
estate generally, and in commercial leasing transactions in particular. 
Under the common law, an agent would owe the following duties to its 
principal: 
 Unbroken service and loyalty (the “duty of undivided loyalty”); 
 Confidentiality; 
 Full disclosure of information necessary for the principal for to 
make well-informed decisions; 
 Acting in the best interest of the principal; 
 Reasonable care and diligence; and 
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 Accountability to the principal. 
However, in Washington State, the legislature in 1996 replaced the 
common law duties agents owe to principals under state common law—
such as the duty of undivided loyalty—with a statutory scheme that, at 
best, causes confusion about the duties an agent owes its principal,4 
particularly in the context of a dual agency representation of the tenant and 
the landlord in the same transaction. 
INTRODUCTION 
A prospective tenant seeking to lease commercial space, commonly 
referred to in commercial leasing as the “Premises”—or even a tenant 
seeking to renew a commercial lease agreement for the tenant’s existing 
Premises—only knows what it knows about the commercial real estate 
market at any given point in time. With the exception of tenants in the 
business of providing commercial real estate services to others, even 
tenants engaged in the business of real estate generally, or commercial real 
estate specifically, will have their financial and legal interests well-served 
by seeking out professional representation from a commercial real estate 
broker. However, for this to be true, that professional representation must 
come with the representative’s commitment to a duty of undivided loyalty 
to the tenant. Commercial real estate brokers “represent” a commercial 
tenant’s interests by leading the process of searching for and selecting new 
premises and negotiating the best deal possible while the prospective 
tenant relies upon the broker’s specialized industry knowledge and 
professional integrity. 
Commercial leases are legal contracts documenting the conclusion 
of inherently complex transactions, involving dozens and dozens of 
moving parts or “deal points.” Each aspect of this transaction must be 
meticulously researched in the market or submarket in which the 
commercial tenant seeks to become or remain located. These deal points 
inevitably become the subject of often intense negotiations with one or 
more prospective landlords. Ultimately, the deal points to which both 
landlord and tenant agree, assuming they are able to do so with the skilled 
representation of their respective agents, will form the basis for a complex 
and often very lengthy commercial contract, most-frequently titled “Lease 
Agreement” or “Agreement of Lease.” This legal contract commonly runs 
between forty and sixty pages, not including referenced attachments. It is 
within this context that small and large business enterprises require the 
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objective, independent, and professional assistance of a commercial real 
estate broker to represent the best interests of their business. 
Prospective tenants often assume and expect that licensing 
requirements and other government regulations compel, or at least require, 
providers of professional commercial real estate services to represent them 
in a manner serving the tenant’s best interests at all times. 
The search for new premises and the resultant leasing contract often 
represent an enterprise’s first or second largest annual operating expense5 
and entail contractual commitments of anywhere between five and twenty 
years, sometimes even longer but rarely shorter. 
Given the complexity of this process and the contractual 
commitments to which the “successful” prospective tenant will be 
subjected, it is difficult to construct a scenario under which the best 
interests of the tenant will be well-served by an agent or broker that also 
represents the landlord in the same transaction. These parties could not be 
more adverse: the landlord wants to command the highest possible rent for 
the longest period of time (i.e., the “Lease Term”) with the fewest 
substantive obligations being owed to the tenant; the tenant, for its part, 
wants to secure the most competitive (i.e., least expensive) aggregate 
annual rental cost, the greatest amount of flexibility in terms of the tenant’s 
ongoing commitment to pay that annual rental cost, and beyond that, wants 
to be left alone to conduct its business. How could the same commercial 
broker ever reconcile such diametrically opposed forces when presuming 
to represent both parties at the same time in a dual agency scenario? In the 
context of legal representation, this is what is known as an unwaivable 
conflict of interest; no amount of advance, written disclosure will “cure” 
the inherent conflict. 
Many commercial tenants in Greater Seattle, given the ethnic, socio-
economic, and cultural diversity of the area’s business community and the 
plethora of small businesses that give the city its unique character, lack the 
economic bargaining power, the commercial business sophistication and 
acumen, and the financial wherewithal to adequately represent their 
business interests without expert, independent, and objective 
representation. Without this expert representation, these tenants may be 
unable to avoid dire, often personal, financial consequences, including 
possible personal bankruptcy, due to lease guarantees for their businesses, 
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as a result of having entered into a bad lease. As the city of Seattle and 
surrounding areas experience more acute pressures to grow and expand, 
the potential for the “retail gentrification” of the city’s most diverse and 
economically-challenged commercial corridors and districts will increase 
accordingly. This increasing pressure results in adverse economic 
consequences on small businesses and their individual owners from 
landlords’ strict enforcement of the terms of leases in buildings determined 
by the landlord to have a more profitable use than leasing to the current 
tenant. Such an increasing pressure may cause an epidemic of small 
business failures. 
Taking into account the inherent asymmetry of both qualitative and 
quantitative information in the commercial real estate marketplace—as 
contrasted with the residential sales market, where everyone has access to 
the same information—the importance of objective and independent 
representation of tenants cannot be overstated. As posited, in pertinent 
part, in the 2014 Conflicts of Interest Research Report: 
Regrettably, the nature of the commercial market for leased 
properties, as well as the process through which commercial tenants 
make their leasing decisions, is more like McMillan’s descriptions of 
transactions taking place in the bazaars of Marrakesh or Yemen and 
less like U.S. capital markets or the residential real estate market.6 
Additionally, inasmuch as full-service CRES firms annually receive 
the lion’s share of their brokerage fees from landlords, it is perhaps 
quixotic to believe that, in a dual agency scenario, these dual agent brokers 
will do anything contrary to the best interests of their landlord clients. This 
may be true even if serving the best interests of the landlords means not 
serving the best interests of a firm’s tenant clients as a consequence, 
because of the risk that landlord clients may complain that the brokerage 
firm is biting the hand that feeds them and immediately terminate the 
professional relationship for that reason. 
Washington’s Real Estate Brokerage Relationships statute7 provides 
a statutory licensing scheme that, by intention, completely supplants the 
traditional, and substantial, fiduciary duties a commercial real estate agent 
would otherwise owe to its principal at common law.8 The statute 
supersedes the common law of agency in a manner and under a regime in 
which an agent’s duties to a tenant might arguably be reduced to that of a 
mere matchmaker, when in fact commercial practice and a prospective 
tenant’s reasonable expectations is that a commercial broker would serve 
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a much larger role than a mere matchmaker. The statute is, in fact, a very 
poor substitute for the common law duties an agent owes its principal and 
appears counterintuitive, if not completely antithetical, to Washington’s 
otherwise robust consumer protections.9 And it does little, if anything, to 
specifically protect the best interests of a prospective tenant. 
Accordingly, without doing violence to the other provisions of 
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, the statute should be amended 
to impose an absolute ban on commercial dual agency. Further, in the 
context of commercial real estate, all duties that an agent would owe to a 
principal under common law should be reinstated to restore the full 
protections a principal is afforded under the common law of agency. There 
can be no middle ground. Advance written notice and a written waiver of 
the inherent conflicts of interest does nothing to address, much less 
ameliorate, those stark conflicts. 
Part I will provide a summary of the relevant portions of the 2014 
Conflicts of Interest Report and provide some information regarding the 
Greater Seattle Area commercial real estate market.10 Part II will provide 
an overview of the common law of agency as it relates to real estate agents 
or brokers, and analysis of the legislative history of Washington’s statutory 
codification of broker agency duties under Revised Code of 
Washington section 18.86. Part III will examine common law as it was 
applied in Washington, provide a discussion of relevant case law, and 
discuss various conflicts of interests that are prohibited under Revised 
Code of Washington section 18.86 and the potential remedies for 
violations of those prohibitions. Finally, Part IV will examine the 
emergence of brokers being principals or fiduciary managers for properties 
they broker, discuss the legal implications of a broker being an undisclosed 
principal in a transaction they broker after Revised Code of Washington 
section 18.86 and discuss the importance of reinstating common law 
fiduciary duties in commercial real estate transactions. 
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PART I 
As stated above, Part I of this Article provides an overview of the 
context within which the legal research, analysis, and arguments are 
presented, including a brief of the Greater Seattle Area commercial real 
estate market, within which the regulatory obligations of the CRES sector 
participants are tested on a daily basis. 
A. The 2014 Conflicts of Interest Research Report 
The 2014 research study conducted by the Center for Real Estate and 
Urban Analysis at The George Washington University School of Business 
in Washington, D.C., leading to the publication in November 2014 of a 
comprehensive research study report,11 serves as the springboard for this 
Article. The purpose of the 2014 Conflicts of Interest Research Report was 
as follows: 
[To] identify the potential conflicts of interest inherent in real estate 
transactions between a commercial tenant and a prospective landlord; 
evaluate the legal, regulatory, and industry mechanisms in place to 
protect the interests of commercial tenants through professional 
representation in these transactions; and where necessary, make 
recommendations for how such tenant protections might be 
strengthened to assure an arm’s length transaction between the 
parties, thereby optimizing the functioning of the commercial real 
estate marketplace.12 
The study made a number of key findings. First, the study found that, 
unlike other U.S. markets, the U.S. commercial leasing market lacks 
transparency and equal access to information for all parties.13 This is due 
to the commercial leasing market being characterized by information 
asymmetry with data regarding market characteristics being almost 
exclusively idiosyncratic to specific CRES firms and the fact that there is 
no centralized or industry standard for tracking and reporting critical 
market data.14 
Second, the study found that, to the extent that any unifying influence 
exists over the commercial leasing market, such influence favors 
landlords, with the market being driven by the supply of available 
premises for lease, not by the demand for premises.15 The CRES sector is 
loosely organized such that issues relating to conflicts of interests have not 
been addressed in any systematic way benefiting tenants, with licensure 
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requirements varying from state to state. Further, the CRES industry has 
openly opposed legislative and regulatory reform efforts seeking to 
improve the quality of representation provided to tenants through 
mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest in dual agency situations. 
Such public opposition has created at least the appearance that full-service 
CRES firms dominate the CRES sector and that they would prefer not to 
have to make such disclosures before representing a tenant, despite 
countervailing, common law duties requiring full disclosure of such 
conflicts. 
These relationships between and among various principals in a real 
estate development or acquisition transaction, or in the course of the 
normal ownership and management of commercial property—developers, 
institutional and other equity investors, and lenders of various types—are 
increasingly complex yet obscured from the public. The roles CRES firms 
play in providing services have become increasingly complex and 
convoluted, to the point that it may be unrealistic to expect the average 
office tenant to understand the full impact of dual agency or consenting to 
other conflicts of interest. 
Finally, the study found that the fundamental relationship between 
landlords and tenants is inherently adversarial, both in the negotiation and 
execution of lease agreements and in the tenant’s occupancy of the 
landlord’s premises. The parties’ respective interests are so inherently 
adverse that the conflict cannot be adequately remedied by the fully 
informed consent of both parties.16 
This final finding raises a fundamental question for the profession: If 
legal ethics prohibit an attorney or a law firm from representing both the 
landlord and a tenant in the negotiations of a lease agreement or in a 
dispute over the interpretation of the terms and conditions in a lease 
agreement, how can the divergent interests of those same parties 
nonetheless be adequately represented by the same CRES firm through 
dual agency?17 
The study also made a number of key recommendations.18 The study 
recommended further research into the practices among full-service CRES 
firms as to the incidence and intensity of actual conflicts of interest in the 
CRES Sector,19 analysis of conflicts of interests policies, procedures, 
practices, and possible best practices among full-service CRES firms, and 
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research into tenants’ depth of understanding about the types and 
significance of various conflicts that may and do occur within the 
commercial leasing marketplace. The report also recommended that the 
CRES sector become more and better organized, potentially modeling the 
National Association of Realtors. Finally, the study recommended a 
Model Code of Conduct be established for CRES firms.20 
The report contained a primer on the CRES sector, including the 
identification of likely parties to commercial real estate transactions and 
the types of transactions in which they are typically engaged21 and 
specifically addressed the increasingly important and diverse roles played 
by full-service brokerage firms in those transactions and the trend toward 
consolidation of market share among the largest full-service commercial 
real estate brokers.22 Increasing consolidation that has taken place in the 
last few decades within the CRES sector;23 as a result, it is perhaps easy to 
understand how the incidence of conflicts of interest in commercial leasing 
transactions may be on the rise.24 The report detailed how, in the span of 
six years (from 2008 to 2013), three large tenant-only CRES firms—Julian 
Studley, The Staubach Companies, and Newmark Real Estate Company, 
Inc.—were acquired by much larger, global, full-service CRES firms, 
removing a substantial amount of tenant-only representation from the 
CRES sector in the United States, by making formerly tenant-only agents 
employees of full-service CRES firms.25 
The report identified a number of situations that, although they may 
not give rise to legal claims, present significant conflicts of interests in the 
CRES sector.26 The following scenarios could arise where the Leasing 
Transaction is closed by a listing broker and tenant agent employed by the 
same full-service CRES firm: 
                                                     
 20. Id. at 10–11. 
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a. The Listing Broker manipulates or otherwise influences the 
commission on the transaction to be paid to the Tenant’s Agent 
to get the lease closed. 
b. Without manipulating or otherwise influencing the amount and 
payment of the Agent’s commission, the Listing Broker offers 
incentives outside the commission structure but within the 
control of the CRES firm, including but not limited to promised 
increases in base salary, benefits, or future advancement within 
the firm. 
c. Without manipulating or otherwise influencing the amount and 
payment of the Agent’s commission or otherwise creating 
specific incentives within the CRES Firm’s ordinary 
compensation structure, the Developer or Property Owner 
promises the Listing Broker additional property listings if the 
Subject Property is fully tenanted within a specified time frame, 
and the Tenant Agent is promised specific opportunities, 
remuneration, or both if such additional property listings are 
awarded to the Listing Broker by the Developer or Property 
Owner. 
d. The Tenant Agent shares with the Listing Broker confidential 
information about the prospective Tenant that is not generally 
publicly available and which the prospective Tenant has shared 
with the Tenant Agent in confidence,27 such as (a) the 
prospective Tenant’s current financial condition; (b) changes in 
the Tenant’s business or market position that could impact the 
prospective Tenant’s future operating income and, consequently, 
its ability to pay rent or other obligations; (c) potential changes 
in the Tenant’s business or industry sector; and (d) the 
prospective Tenant’s simultaneous negotiation of one or more 
comparable commercial leases as a hedge against not being able 
to secure from the Listing Broker the terms and conditions the 
prospective Tenant requires or prefers regarding the Premises.28 
The report provides an explanation on how U.S. commercial leasing 
operates as a marketplace.29 Two market concepts must be understood to 
fully comprehend how markets function: the “workable market platform” 
component and the concept of “market efficiency.”30 
                                                     
 27. See, e.g., Advisory and Transaction Services, CBRE, https://www.cbre.com/real-estate-
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           28. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at 19–20.  
 29. Id. at 64–71 (Part V). 
 30. Id. at 65–66. 
2019] David v. Goliath 179 
The workable market platform has five essential elements, including 
that (1) information flows smoothly, (2) property rights are appropriately 
protected, (3) people can be trusted to honor their promises, (4) 
externalities are minimized, and (5) competition is fostered.31 
As to the concept of market efficiency, the Efficient Market Theory 
posits that an “informationally efficient” market will always arrive at the 
correct price.32 At issue in Eugene Fama’s work is whether markets 
operate rationally, such that in the face of perfect information prices reflect 
all such information, or are they also susceptible to other forces, such as 
investors’ hopes and fears? 
When markets are inefficient, the party in possession of and 
controlling the flow of information gains a superior bargaining position. 
Among other disadvantages to tenants caused by asymmetrical 
information in the U.S. commercial leasing market is the lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of what all relatively comparable options 
might be at any given point in time without exclusive reliance on the tenant 
agent. 
The report also examined the Commercial Real Estate Services 
sector in the United States.33 The report found that over the past nine years 
(preceding the publication of the Conflicts of Interest Research Study 
Report in November 2014), CRES firms have grown in size, geographic 
reach, breadth of services offered, and overall importance to and 
involvement in various aspects of the development and financing of 
commercial properties, both domestically and internationally. They have 
become increasingly global, and the more landlord-focused CRES firms 
have expanded their tenant representation capabilities primarily by 
acquiring U.S. national, regional, or local tenant-only brokerages. Local 
firms become or are swallowed-up by regional or national firms, while 
national firms have become or are swallowed-up by international firms. In 
2013, the five largest, full-service CRES firms were involved in 150,461 
commercial property transactions generating over one-half of $1 billion in 
commercial property transaction revenues ($553.3 million in the 
aggregate).34 The five largest, full-service CRES firms also generated over 
$16 billion in aggregate, total revenues in 2013.35 There is a substantial 
                                                     
 31. Id. (citing JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF 
MARKETS (2002)). 
 32. John H. Cochrane, Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Markets, and the Nobel Prize, CHI. BOOTH 
REV. (May 20, 2014), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/winter-2013/eugene-fama-efficient-
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 33. JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 71–77 
(2002). 
  34. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. 
  35. Id. 
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disparity between the size and scale of the five largest full-service CRES 
firms and the five largest full-service CRES firms operating in the United 
States in 2013.36 
B. Deal Points 
In the negotiations between landlords and tenants in a commercial 
real estate context, a number of deal points exist that serve to shape the 
final lease conditions, including obligations on the part of each party. Real 
Estate Law: Fundamentals for The Development Process offers a 
thorough analysis of these deal points, devoting fifty pages to legal issues 
in property management and leasing of commercial properties.37 A brief 
excerpt is included below to provide greater understanding as to the 
inherently adversarial nature of landlord and tenant negotiations and the 
inherent complexity of commercial leasing transactions: 
While real estate lawyers go to great lengths to make sure real estate 
contract documents such as commercial lease agreements address all 
likely scenarios and eventualities, and are compensated handsomely 
to do so, inevitably reasonable parties – much less unreasonable 
parties – are going to have disagreements in interpreting their rights, 
duties, and mutual responsibilities under such documents.38 
Professor Poorvu, in his chapter in The Real Estate Game on 
“Operations,” offers the following listing of commercial lease agreement 
sections or major clauses as his framework to understanding Property 
Management: 
 The parties;  
 Eminent domain; 
 The commencement date;   
 Default by tenant; 
 Building and premises;  
 Default by landlord; 
 Use of the premises; 
 Security deposit; 
 Term: original and extended;  
                                                     
 36. JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 72 
(2002). 
 37. PETER E. SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, REAL ESTATE LAW: FUNDAMENTALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 399–449 (2016). 
  38. Id. 
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 Subordination, estoppel certificates and nondisturbance; 
 Base and additional rent; 
 Subletting and assignment; 
 Tenant’s obligations;   
 Consents; 
 Landlord’s obligations; 
 Condition of premises; 
 Compliance with laws;    
 Tenant improvements; 
 Environment; 
 Landlord’s work; 
 Insurance Broker;  
 Parking; 
 Damage to premises; and   
 Miscellaneous.39 
Depending upon the prospective tenant, its business priorities and 
needs, the condition and location of the prospective Premises, and the per-
ipatetic nature of the plethora of Greater Seattle Area’s commercial corri-
dors, districts, shopping centers, and stand-alone and pad-site buildings, 
any one or more of the commercial lease provisions excerpted above, more 
than merely a handful of these issues could prove problematic in the se-
lection of Premises and arms-length, third-party negotiation of a Lease 
Agreement to that prospective tenant. Chapter Eleven of Real Estate Law: 
Fundamentals of The Development Process covers each of the typical 
lease provisions outlined by Professor Poorvu and excerpted above, delves 
into specific detail for each of these lease provisions, and also adds a few 
Professor Poorvu did not include in The Real Estate Game.40 Given the 
myriad potential permutations of this list, and considering further that a 
potential tenant’s list of priorities for and sensitivities to these deal points 
may diverge dramatically from those of the prospective landlord, it is easy 
to understand the inherent complexities of, and lease issues as to, which 
the tenant’s and the landlord’s interests will be at odds, in a commercial 
leasing transaction. 
                                                     
 39. Id. at 406 (citing WILLIAM POORVU & JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, THE REAL ESTATE GAME: 
THE INTELLIGENT GUIDE TO DECISION-MAKING AND INVESTMENT 191 (1999)). 
 40. Id. at 405–19. 
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C. The Greater Seattle Commercial Real Estate Market in 2018 
Included within the context provided above is a snapshot of the 
Greater Seattle Area commercial real estate market, within which the 
regulatory obligations of the CRES sector participants are tested, on a 
daily basis, in terms of brokers’ and agents’ compliance, in their day-to-
day dealings with their clients, under Revised Code of Washington 
section 18.86. In an over-heated commercial real estate market, the 
professionalism and ethical performance of commercial real estate brokers 
and agents, whose earnings are determined by the volume and monetary 
sizes of their annual transactions, is continually tested. As the following 
statistics reveal, in this regard the Greater Seattle commercial real estate 
market may serve as an excellent barometer for how the foundations of the 
law of principal and agent are being honored, or abused, under the far less 
rigorous statutory regime under Revised Code of Washington 
section 18.86. 
The Greater Seattle Area has experienced tremendous growth over 
the recent years; however, this growth in Seattle has slowed recently.41 
And despite fears of a looming recession, Seattle remains an attractive 
choice for investors.42 This level of growth comes at a cost, with increases 
to the cost of living, exacerbation of wealth inequalities, and additional 
pressure on the infrastructure.43 It is no surprise then that many cities are 
actively trying to avoid “Seattle-ization.”44 The area is home to an 
estimated 3.8 million people, by a 2017 estimate, with further population 
growth expected and having already occurred.45 The labor market has seen 
some slowing, but is still strong with unemployment at 4.1% in March 
                                                     
 41. Compare PWC & URB. LAND INST., EMERGING TRENDS IN REAL ESTATE: UNITED STATES 
AND CANADA 2019 (2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/assets 
/pwc-emerging-trends-in-real-estate-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7AJ-TY3N] (ranking Seattle 16th in 
overall real estate prospects), with Mike Wheatly, PwC Names Seattle as Top Real Estate Market in 
the U.S., REALTY BIZ NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017), https://realtybiznews.com/pwc-names-seattle-as-top-
real-estate-market-in-the-u-s/98745046/ [https://perma.cc/K8YT-VX88], and Gene Balk, Census: 
Seattle is the Fastest-Growing Big City in the U.S., SEATTLE TIMES (May 22, 2014), http://blogs. 
seattletimes.com/fyi-guy/2014/05/22/census-seattle-is-the-fastest-growing-big-city-in-the-u-s/ [https: 
//perma.cc/UAG8-RNUK]. 
 42. KIDDER MATHEWS, SEATTLE OFFICE: REAL ESTATE MARKET REVIEW 1ST QUARTER 2019 
(2019) [hereinafter KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT], http://www.kiddermathews.com/ 
downloads/research/office-market-research-seattle-2019-1q.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JMS-JYAZ]. 
 43. Gene Balk, ‘Seattle-ization’? American Cities Fear What’s Happened Here, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/data/seattle-ization-american-cities-fear-
whats-happened-here/ [https://perma.cc/P4WG-E6UR]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. U.S. Census Bureau, Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA Metro Area, CENSUS REPORTER (2017), 
https://censusreporter.org/profiles/31000US42660-seattle-tacoma-bellevue-wa-metro-area/ 
[https://perma.cc/AK3V-KYJE]. 
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2019,46 with the national average at 3.8%.47 The information, professional 
and business services, and construction sectors are experiencing the fastest 
growth in the Greater Seattle Area.48 Also, payroll employment increased 
in Washington in January 2019 at a rate of 3.3%,49 which is higher than 
the national average of roughly 1%.50 CBRE, JLL, and Cushman & 
Wakefield, three of the world’s largest full-service CRES firms, are all 
represented in the total payroll numbers for the region, relying on dual 
agency as an important revenue stream. Within the Greater Seattle market 
the largest firms profiled in Appendix D to the 2014 Conflicts of Interest 
Research Report have a strong presence, with the exception of Fischer & 
Company; this list includes international full-service CRES firms such as 
CBRE Group, JLL, Cushman & Wakefield, Newmark Knight Frank, and 
Savills Studley. Also included are tenant-only firms such as Cresa, Hughes 
Marino, and Mohr Partners, which compete in the Greater Seattle Area.51 
Additionally, some more-local, full-service firms have a significant 
presence in the marketplace, such as Kidder Matthews and NAI Puget 
Sound Properties.52 
                                                     
 46. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., ECONOMY AT A GLANCE, SEATTLE-TACOMA-BELLEVUE (2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.wa_seattle_msa.htm [https://perma.cc/P9JP-6ZL2]. 
 47. National Employment Monthly Update, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 7, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/national-employment-monthlyupdate.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3PPS-K94N]. 
 48. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 46; see also COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST 
REPORT: PUGET SOUND REGION Q3 2018 OFFICE REPORT (2018) [hereinafter COLLIERS Q3 2018 
OFFICE REPORT], https://www2.colliers.com/en/Research/Puget-Sound/Q3-2018-Office-Market-
Report [https://perma.cc/QMD7-F3FR]. 
 49. Strong Payroll Hiring Continues into January, WASH. STATE EMP. SECURITY DEP’T (Mar. 
6, 2019), https://esd.wa.gov/newsroom/strong-payroll-hiring-continues-into-january [https://perma. 
cc/6MEA-HH6B]. 
 50. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NEWS RELEASE: THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—APRIL 2019 
(May 3, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05032019.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/JRB8-5BPS] (stating that in April, civilian employment was at 258,693,000 with an increase of 
263,000 resulting in approximately a 1% increase). 
 51. See Our Offices Seattle, WA, MOHR PARTNERS, INC., https://www.mohrpartners.com/ 
location/seattle-wa/ [https://perma.cc/E4T6-SZ9K]; Seattle, CRESA, https://www.cresa.com/seattle-
wa [https://perma.cc/GD5G-NYST]; Seattle Commercial Real Estate, NEWMARK KNIGHT FRANK, 
http://www.ngkf.com/home/about-our-firm/global-offices/us-offices/seattle.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
3SG6-SQEY]; Seattle Cushman & Wakefield, CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, http://www.cushman 
wakefield.com/en/offices/seattle-1 [https://perma.cc/G8SA-SFN6]; Seattle Office About, CBRE, 
http://www.cbre.us/people-and-offices/corporate-offices/seattle [https://perma.cc/G8M6-APBA]; 
Seattle Location, SAVILLS STUDLEY, http://www.savills-studley.com/offices/seattle.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/P4MM-FLUQ] (though denoting Savills-Studley as a tenant-only firm may be 
inaccurate given it is owned by Savills, which offers services for landlords); West Locations, JLL, 
https://www.us.jll.com/en/locations/west [https://perma.cc/Z52Z-72T3]. 
 52. About Us, KIDDER MATTHEWS, http://www.kiddermathews.com/ [https://perma.cc/W6A9-
X636]; Our Team, NAI PUGET SOUND PROPERTIES, https://www.nai-psp.com/our-team/ 
[https://perma.cc/LV5B-BQM5].  
184 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:169 
The Greater Seattle Area, often called the Puget Sound Area, is rather 
large and covers a number of cities, including Bellevue, Tacoma, and 
Redmond, and there is considerable variance in commercial market trends 
between these narrower markets. Although these commercial 
marketplaces are complex, they can largely be broken down into four 
discrete categories that bear directly on providing an accurate description 
of the Greater Seattle Area commercial property marketplace: Office 
Space, Industrial, Retail, and Multifamily. The market data below 
comprises the most recent data at the time of writing. 
D. Office Space 
The tech, life sciences, and co-working fields are all powerhouses in 
the office space market, with Amazon, WeWork, Stripe, T-Mobile, and 
Seattle Genetics all signing notable leases in 201853 and Facebook and 
Seattle CBD reflecting sizeable transactions in 2019.54 Demand has also 
increased on the Eastside, with Amazon leasing 377,000 square feet of the 
proposed Summit III development in Bellevue.55 The Greater Seattle Area 
as a whole has seen a positive absorption rate (a measurement of demand 
in the market) with a high estimate at 271,53656 square feet and a low 
estimate at 6,095 square feet.57 The differences in estimates likely reflect 
differing definitions of the geographical boundaries of the Puget Sound or 
Greater Seattle Area. The vacancy rate for office space has declined, 
reaching the lowest rate since the Great Recession.58 The first quarter 
vacancy rate for office space in the Seattle Area was below 10 points at 
8.1%.59 By way of contrast nationwide: 
Vacant office space in the U.S. increased slightly by 10 basis points 
(bps) during the fourth quarter of 2017 (Q4 2017) to 13 percent, 
according to the latest analysis from CBRE. For the year, vacancy 
inched up 10 bps, marking the first year-over-year increase in 
vacancy since 2010. 
                                                     
 53. COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST REPORT, PUGET SOUND REGION, Q2 2018 OFFICE 
(on file with the Seattle University Law Review); NEWMARK KNIGHT FRANK, RESEARCH Q3 2018, 
PUGET SOUND OFFICE MARKET (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). 
 54. NEWMARK KNIGHT FRANK, RESEARCH 1Q 2019 PUGET SOUND OFFICE MARKET 
[hereinafter NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT], http://www.ngkf.com/Uploads/FileManager 
/Market%20Reports/1Q19-Seattle-Office-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C9P-W7CJ].  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42. 
 58. NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54. 
 59. Id.; see also KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42 (estimating vacancy rates at 
6.48%). 
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The vacancy rate in suburban markets increased 10 bps, to 14.2 
percent and downtown vacancy ticked up 10 bps to 10.7 percent. 
Vacancy continued to fall in a majority of U.S. office markets, and 
the national office vacancy rate remains near its post-recession low.60 
And rents are forecast to continue rising.61 Availability of space is 
estimated to be at 8.8%62 on the low end or at 12.7% on the high end.63 
However, large spaces of greater than 100,000 square feet have become 
increasingly scarce.64 
Average rents have again reached all-time highs, despite Amazon 
leases setting records in the third-quarter of 2018.65 The U.S. index for 
commercial office leases was $34.06 per square foot as of the third quarter 
of 2018;66 yet, the estimate price per square foot per year for office space 
within the city of Seattle is about $42 per square foot.67 When taking the 
Greater Seattle Area into account as a whole, the average asking rental 
price per square foot ranges between $33.1668 and $37.14.69 7.3 million 
square feet of new space is currently under construction, and 62% of the 
office space being constructed has been pre-leased.70 Finally, investor 
confidence in the region for office space has remained strong, with a 
particular emphasis in Seattle and Bellevue.71 
Given the remarkable and meteoric rise in Seattle market office rents 
and historically low vacancy rates—particularly when compared to a 
                                                     
 60. U.S. Office Vacancy Ends 2017 at 13 Percent, CBRE (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www. 
cbre.com/about/media-center/us-office-vacancy-ends-2017-at-13-percent [https://perma.cc/D7DT-
GVQ9]. 
 61. NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54. 
 62. KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42. 
 63. SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019 SEATTLE (2019) [hereinafter SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019 
REPORT], https://pdf.euro.savills.co.uk/usa/market-reports/research-mim-seattlewa2019q1.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/52CA-TKTS]. 
 64. SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH, SAVILLIS STUDLEY REPORT: SEATTLE OFFICE SECTOR Q3 
2018 (2018) [hereafter SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH Q3 2018 REPORT], https://pdf.euro.savills 
.co.uk/usa/market-reports/3q18-seattle-office-market-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QUE-QKBL]. 
 65. Compare SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 63 (noting steady increase in 
rents since third quarter 2018), with SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH Q3 2018 REPORT, supra note 64 
(noting all-time high average rents). 
 66. SAVILLS STUDLEY RESEARCH Q3 2018 REPORT, supra note 64. 
 67. NAI PUGET SOUND PROPERTIES, MARKET REPORT Q1 2019 OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL & RETAIL, 
PUGET SOUND REGION, WASHINGTON [hereinafter PSP Q1 2019 REPORT] (on file with the Seattle 
University Law Review) (estimating yearly rental price per square foot at $40.83 for Seattle); KIDDER 
Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42 (estimating yearly rental price per square foot in Seattle at 
$42.00); NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54 (estimating yearly rental price per square 
foot at $43.31). 
 68. PSP Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 67. 
 69. NEWMARK Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 54; see also SAVILLS RESEARCH, Q1 2019 
REPORT, supra note 63 (estimating rental rates at $38.85). 
 70. KIDDER Q1 2019 OFFICE REPORT, supra note 42. 
 71. Id. 
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national average vacancy rate of almost double—combined with an 
accelerating consolidation among the largest, international CRES sector 
firms with a substantial market presence in Greater Seattle, which 
consolidation has included the absorption of well-established, tenant only 
brokerages in the marketplace such as Washington Partners (by JLL in 
March 2016),72 the question must be posed whether the landlord’s market 
in Greater Seattle is, at least in part, a consequence of too much 
concentration at the top? 
E. Industrial 
The industrial commercial real estate market in the Greater Seattle 
Area has an average annual rental price per square foot of $10.39 and a 
vacancy rate of approximately 4.2%.73 This sector has seen negative 
absorption of 109,577 square feet, though demand remains strong with 5.8 
million square feet of space under construction.74 This square footage is 
up from the 4.34 million square feet that were under construction at the 
end of the third quarter of 2018.75 One of the driving forces behind 
warehouse demand has been e-commerce.76 
F. Retail 
The retail commercial real estate market in the Greater Seattle Area 
has an average annual rental price per square foot of $20.81 and a vacancy 
rate of approximately 3.2%.77 The absorption rate is positive year-to-date 
at 88,217 square feet.78 Although retail absorption as a whole has remained 
positive, malls have seen negative absorption of late.79 This negative trend 
                                                     
 72. As with the Savills acquisition of pioneering, tenant-only brokerage firm Julian J. Studley in 
2008, detailed in the 2014 conflicts of interest research study report, the market absorption by the 
former of the latter enterprise did not make Savills a tenant-only brokerage firm. Quite to the contrary: 
The acquisition by a full-service CRES firm of an exclusively tenant-only commercial brokerage 
merely eliminates another tenant-only brokerage from the range or representation options afforded to 
prospective tenants in a given marketplace and allows the acquiring full-service CRES firm to market 
its tenant-only services while further proliferating in that market the practice of dual agency. As the 
saying goes: “When you dance with the devil, the devil doesn’t change. The devil changes you.” 
 73. PSP Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 67. 
 74. KIDDER MATHEWS, 1ST QUARTER 2019 REAL ESTATE MARKET REVIEW: SEATTLE 
INDUSTRIAL, https://kidder.com/wp-content/uploads/market_report/industrial-market-research-seattle 
-2019-1q.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ9X-WTRA]. 
 75. Id. 
 76. COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST REPORT, PUGET SOUND REGION, Q3 2018 
INDUSTRIAL (2018) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). 
 77. PSP Q1 2019 REPORT, supra note 67. 
 78. Id. 
 79. COLLIERS INT’L, RESEARCH & FORECAST REPORT, PUGET SOUND REGION, Q3 2018 RETAIL 
(2018) [hereinafter COLLIERS Q3 2018 RETAIL REPORT] (on file with the Seattle University Law 
Review). 
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for malls will likely continue into 2019, with the closing of several large 
chains such as Macy’s, Sears, and JC Penny.80 
“Mom and Pop” stores operating in truly urban locations, sometimes 
owned by and serving mostly ethnic minorities, are not reflected by the 
negative mall absorption rate because their customer base is not as mobile 
and such tenants typically seek and occupy walkable neighborhood retail. 
Fitness chains have continued to drive demand for retail generally, along 
with Amazon opening two Amazon Go stores in the Seattle Area in 2018.81 
Note, however, it will take some time nationwide to see where brick and 
mortar stores end up against “e-tailers,” with the latter beginning to show 
an interest in brick and mortar stores. 
G. Multifamily 
The multifamily commercial real estate sector has also seen growth, 
though this sector of commercial real estate is subject to more significant 
regional variance. Year-to-date absorption for Seattle was 13,455 square 
feet, with the average asking rent at $1,545 in the last quarter of 2018.82 
Urban King County “set a record for price per square foot” despite 
transaction volumes being 20% lower than in 2016.83 New construction of 
multifamily units has also increased year over year.84 In spring 2018, a 
University of Washington study estimated the average King County rent 
to be at $1,741 or $2.18 per square foot.85 The vacancy rate for Seattle is 
estimated to be at 5.4%,86 with a 3.8% estimate for King County as a 
whole.87 
                                                     
 80. Id.; KIDDER MATHEWS, REAL ESTATE MARKET OVERVIEW, SEATTLE RETAIL, 1ST QUARTER 
2019 [hereinafter KIDDER Q1 2019 RETAIL REPORT], https://kidder.com/wp-content/uploads 
/market_report/retail-market-research-seattle-2019-1q.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NGS-LCDJ]. 
 81. COLLIERS Q3 2018 RETAIL REPORT, supra note 79; KIDDER Q1 2019 RETAIL REPORT, supra 
note 80. 
 82. KIDDER MATHEWS, REAL ESTATE MARKET OVERVIEW, SEATTLE MULTIFAMILY, 4TH 
QUARTER 2018 [hereinafter KIDDER Q4 2018 MULTIFAMILY REPORT], https://kidder.com/wp-
content/uploads/market_report/multifamily-market-research-seattle-2018-4q.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EV7Q-LDM4]. 
 83. COLLIERS INT’L, New Market Research Sheds Light on Puget Sound Apartment Sales (Feb. 
21, 2019), https://www2.colliers.com/en/News/Puget-Sound/2019-Apartment-Market-Study [https:// 
perma.cc/5FY7-3JJG]. 
 84. KIDDER Q4 2018 MULTIFAMILY REPORT, supra note 82. 
 85. U. OF WASH. RUNSTAD DEP’T OF REAL ESTATE, WASHINGTON STATE APARTMENT MARKET 
REPORT – SPRING 2018 (2018) [hereinafter UW SPRING 2018 STUDY], http://realestate.washington. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018SpringApartmentMarketReport.docx.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4 
AZ-JKR8]. 
 86. KIDDER Q4 2018 MULTIFAMILY REPORT, supra note 82. 
 87. UW SPRING 2018 STUDY, supra note 85. 
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PART II 
Part I provided the context and market realities within which 
commercial real estate brokers and agents operate in 2019 under the 
statutory licensing scheme initially enacted by the legislature in 1968. The 
below Part II provides a detailed examination and analysis of the state of 
the law of principal and agent in Washington at the time the legislature 
considered moving from a common law regime of duties, obligations, 
rights, and expectations among the parties in an agency relationship to a 
statutorily defined relationship between real estate brokers and agents, on 
the one hand, and their clients—buyers and sellers; tenants and 
landlords—on the other. Additionally, Part II examines the legislative 
history of Washington’s statutory codification of broker agency duties 
under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 and posits, if it wasn’t 
broken, why did the legislature seek to fix it?  
A. Law of Principal and Agent under the Common Law (Master and 
Servant) 
In order to understand the impact of Revised Code of 
Washington section 18.86 on the practice of commercial brokerage at the 
time of its enactment, it is critical to understand the breadth and depth of 
the system it purported to replace at the time of its introduction: The 
common law of principal and agent. 
Unless superseded by state statute, real estate agents are subject to 
the common law of agency. Both agents and brokers in the real estate 
industry are licensed professionals according to the state law in the state 
wherein their principal place of business is located, and according to any 
other state in which they do business, depending on such other states’ 
laws.88 The licensure and testing requirements, if and when applicable, for 
an “agent” are less-onerous than for a “broker.” Agents are allowed to 
engage in commercial real estate services such as office leasing only under 
the direction and supervision of a licensed broker. Someone who holds a 
broker’s license but is working under another licensed broker in a 
supervisory role is commonly referred to as an associate broker in order to 
                                                     
 88. For a comprehensive analysis of how nine states and the District of Columbia treat real estate 
“brokers” or “agents,” see generally SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY REPORT, supra note 1, at 
Appendix E: Comparison of Disparate Commercial Brokerage Regulatory Frameworks. In 
Washington State, all professionals must be licensed as “brokers” with more requirements to be a 
managing or designated broker with the ability to supervise other brokers. WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 18.85.101, 18.85.111, 18.85.121 (2019). 
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distinguish that associate broker from the role of the supervisory broker 
having liability over the associate brokers and agents in that office.89 
Under the common law, an agent owes to its principal a duty of 
undivided loyalty from which all other fiduciary duties emanate or, at a 
minimum, all other duties should be interpreted and evaluated. “An agent 
has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters 
connected with the agency relationship.”90 
An agent’s more specific duties of loyalty include a duty not to 
acquire a material benefit from a third party in connection with 
transactions or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or 
otherwise through the agent’s use of position; a duty not to deal with 
the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party; a duty not to compete 
with the principal or assist the principal’s competitors during the 
duration of the agency relationship; and a duty not to use property of 
the principal, and not to use or communicate confidential information 
of the principal, for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party. 
A principal may consent to conduct by the agent that would otherwise 
breach a duty of loyalty, but in obtaining the principal’s consent, the 
agent must act in good faith and fully disclose material information 
to the principal.91 
An agent also owes its principal a duty of confidentiality. “An agent 
is obligated to safeguard his principal’s confidence and secrets. A real 
estate broker, therefore, must keep confidential any information that might 
weaken his principal’s bargaining position if it were revealed.”92 However, 
this duty does not include an obligation to withhold material facts 
concerning the condition of the property.93 
Agents owe a duty of full disclosure to facilitate well-informed 
decisions by the principal. “An agent is obligated to disclose to his 
principal all relevant and material information that the agent knows and 
that pertains to the scope of the agency.”94 Agents must also exercise 
reasonable care and diligence in pursuing the affairs of the principal: 
                                                     
 89. For a comparison of the testing and licensure requirements for real estate agents and brokers 
in nine states and the District of Columbia, see generally SMIRNIOTOPOULOS, 2014 COI STUDY 
REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix E: Comparison of Disparate Commercial Brokerage Regulatory 
Frameworks. 
 90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
 91. Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1052–53 (2007); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.06 (2006). 
 92. NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS: RISK MGMT. & LICENSE LAW FORUM, FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
(May 15, 2013), http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/handouts-and-brochures/2014/nar-fiduciary 
-duty-032213.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AT2-SDDP]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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The standard of care expected of a real estate broker representing a 
seller or buyer is that of a competent real estate professional. . . . This 
duty includes an obligation to affirmatively discover facts relating to 
his principal’s affairs that a reasonable and prudent real estate broker 
would be expected to investigate. Simply put, this is the same duty 
any professional, such as a doctor or lawyer, owes to his patient or 
client.95 
Finally, an agent has a duty of accountability to the principal and 
must account for all money or property a principal has entrusted to the 
agent.96 
B. The Legislative History of Revised Code of Washington Section 18.86 
and the Statutory Scheme Superseding the Common Law of Duties of 
Agency for Brokers 
As demonstrated above, the prevailing common law of Principal and 
Agent in Washington afforded the clients of professional real estate 
services a comprehensive set of affirmative duties owed by real estate 
brokers and their agents, whether for commercial property or residential 
services, to the sellers and buyers, and owners and renters, respectively, of 
real property interests. The questions remain, then, what improvements did 
the legislature intend to make to the common law of Principal and Agent 
in the enactment of Revised Code of Washington section 18.86? 
C. 1995–1996, House Bill 1659 and Senate Bill 5554 
In 1996, the Washington State Legislature passed House Bill (HB) 
1659, codified as Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.97 The 
express purpose of this bill was to clarify the duties of real estate agents 
for brokers and consumers and, for dual agency, to require express 
disclosure as to who the real estate agent is representing.98 However, the 
Washington Association of Realtors (WAR), the agency that proposed the 
legislation, provided the House Commerce and Labor Committee with a 
memorandum that noted two other objectives of the bill were to eliminate 
imputed knowledge and vicarious liability and to “reduce instances of dual 
agency.”99 After several drafts and amendments, the bill was passed 
unanimously. 
                                                     
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
  97. See Bill Information > HB 1659 - 1995-96, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, https://app.leg.wa. 
gov/billsummary?BillNumber=1659&Initiative=false&Year=1995 [https://perma.cc/RYV8-4AAD]. 
 98. H.R. 54-2EHB 1659, Reg. Sess., at 1–2 (Wash. 1996). 
 99. Memorandum from Wash. Ass’n of Realtors to House Commerce and Labor Comm., at 1 
(Jan. 23, 1996) (on file with the Washington State Archives, House of Representatives Commerce and 
Labor Committee, Meeting Files Jan. 29, 1996). 
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The bill, in its original form, superseded all common law duties—not 
just those inconsistent.100 “This chapter applies to the exclusion of 
common law duties and responsibilities of principal and agent which have 
to this date been applied to real estate brokers affiliated licensees and their 
principals.”101 A similar senate version of this bill with the same language 
was described as “supersed[ing] all case law establishing the duties and 
responsibilities owed by a licensee to a principal.”102 After negotiations 
among stakeholders, the complete exclusion of common law was amended 
to supersede common law only to the extent inconsistent with the duties 
in the statute.103 
In a committee hearing for HB 1659, a representative of the Real 
Property section of the Washington State Bar Association expressed 
concern that, while well meaning, the drafters of the bill “went too far.”104 
He highlighted the risk that unscrupulous people would put blanket 
waivers in their forms, waiving duties that were intended to substitute for 
the common law duties.105 While this testimony does offer limited insight 
into a concern regarding the exclusion of common law in the final bill, the 
final bill directly addressed these concerns by making most duties non-
waivable.106 Further, negotiations and further discussion among the 
stakeholders appear to have occurred outside the legislative history of the 
bill.107 This reduces to mere speculation the reason or reasons why the “not 
inconsistent with” exception to existing common law was added before 
passage of the legislation. 
In HB 1659, as originally introduced, a dual agent did not have a duty 
to abstain from actions adverse or detrimental to either party’s interests in 
a transaction. Instead, the duty was limited to a specific transaction. A 
broker would have had a duty to “take no action that is adverse or 
detrimental to the transaction” only after a purchase and sale agreement or 
lease was entered into.108 Further, in the original form of the bill, the dual 
agent had a duty, owed separately to each party, to buy, sell, or lease a 
property at a “price, terms, and conditions acceptable” to the respective 
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party.109 Both of these portions were significantly changed between the 
first and the second version. For dual agents, the duty regarding taking no 
adverse action was changed to “take no action adverse or detrimental to 
either party’s interest in a transaction.”110 The “price, terms, and 
conditions” duty was removed completely.111 
The effect of these changes arguably brings a dual agent’s duty to 
take no action detrimental or adverse to the other party’s interests to the 
act of negotiating the deals; however, it is difficult to imagine a situation 
where a dual agent is not acting adverse to one side or the other in a 
negotiation; negotiating upwards or downwards on the price alone would 
be detrimental to the other party. Additionally, if this duty of a tenant 
representative is only actuated once the Premises have been selected 
through a completed search process undertaken by the tenant 
representative under a dual agency scenario, many if not all of the common 
law duties an agent owes its principal may have already been breached 
prior to that triggering point. Accordingly, imposing quasi-fiduciary duties 
on a dual agent only in the context of negotiating and documenting a Lease 
Agreement for Premises, and only after the selection of Premises through 
a process in which the tenant representative’s fiduciary duties at common 
law have been violated appears a half-measure, at best, toward protecting 
tenants in these transactions. When offering advice or negotiation tactics 
to one party to the transaction, the agent is inherently taking action 
detrimental to the other side. 
It is then ironic that, in seeming to attempt to provide slightly more 
protections for principals in the statutory scheme, inherent inability to 
satisfy the statutory duties is created. If the duty only applied after a 
purchase and sale agreement had been entered into, as contemplated under 
the original language of the proposed legislation, an agent would have no 
difficulty satisfying the duty to “take no action adverse or detrimental” to 
either party during negotiations. If the duty to take no action adverse or 
detrimental was limited to after the purchase and sale agreement or lease 
was entered into, the negotiations would have been completed and would 
not implicate this duty. And if the agent’s duty is to find, sell, or lease a 
property at a “price, terms, and conditions acceptable” to the principal, 
language which was also removed, the duty can logically be complied with 
during negotiations so long as the ultimate deal is acceptable to both 
parties. Regardless of the logical difficulties of this reimagining of the duty 
of loyalty, the contours of this duty have not been amended since the 
statute was enacted. 
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D. 1997–1998, House Bill 1955 
In 1997, the legislature made worse the inherent inadequacies of, and 
inequities visited upon tenants through, the original enactment of HB 1659 
by enacting an emergency amendment to the statute through HB 1995.112 
This amendment clarified some language and added that different brokers 
within the same firm representing buyers competing for a single seller or 
sellers competing for a single buyer does not by itself create a conflict of 
interest.113 The underlying reason for this amendment was to give parties 
the ability to terminate an agency relationship by notice, instead of just by 
expiration, completion, or mutual agreement; something that has nothing 
to do with this “clarification” of the conflict of interest rules in a way that 
makes dual agency representation easier for the commercial brokerage 
community. 
E. 2013, Substitute Senate Bill 5352 and House Bill 1487 
In 2013, the legislature again amended Revised Code of Washington 
section 18.86, this time through Substitute Senate Bill (SSB) 5352. This 
amendment had two purposes. The first purpose was to bring the statute in 
line with the new language used in the recently amended real estate broker 
licensing statute, Revised Code of Washington section 18.85.114 To this 
end, the word licensee was replaced with broker throughout the statute and 
other language was amended. 
The second purpose was to provide and clarify that the statute 
superseded all common law fiduciary duties. As such, the legislature made 
the following changes to Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.110, 
with underlined text being added and strike-through text being removed: 
The duties under this chapter are statutory duties and not fiduciary 
duties. This chapter supersedes ((only the duties of the parties under 
the common law, including)) the fiduciary duties of an agent to a 
principal ((, to the extent inconsistent with this chapter)) under the 
common law. The common law continues to apply to the parties in 
all other respects.115 
This intent was echoed by the public testimony during a Senate 
committee on commerce and labor hearing of the bill. 
The Appellate Court in Division II made a decision that flew in the 
face of agency law regarding the fiduciary duty of real estate brokers 
                                                     
  112. H.R. 1955, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997). 
 113. H.R. 55-HB 1955, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 1997).  
 114. S. 5352, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4 (substitute senate bill, Wash. 2013); see also H.R. 63-
HB 1487, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). 
 115. S. 5352, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 11 (substitute senate bill, Wash. 2013). 
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to clients. The Supreme Court corrected the issue in a recent decision 
and said the agency law speaks for itself and the statutory duties 
control. The Court also said a broker owes a statutory fiduciary duty. 
This bill clarifies the duty owed by a broker to a consumer.116 
The public testimony above was likely referring to Jackowski v. 
Borchelt,117 and the Division II Court of Appeals decision Jackowski v. 
Borchelt,118 although references to these two cases do not appear explicitly 
in the legislative history of Substitute Senate Bill (SSB) 5352. The Court 
of Appeals in Jackowski stated that “[f]or clarity, we reiterate that chapter 
18.86 RCW does not abrogate professional and fiduciary duties of real 
estate agents.”119 The correction on this point from the Washington 
Supreme Court came when it stated the following: “Since the language of 
the statute, RCW 18.86.110, is not ambiguous, we will not construe it to 
mean anything different from what it says: common law duties continue 
only to the extent they have not been limited by or are not otherwise 
inconsistent with the statute.”120 
Although the stated purpose was to correct a “misconception” that 
the statutory duties superseded common law fiduciary duties, the 
amendment to Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.110 went 
further than simply correcting any misconceptions. It removed the 
language “to the extent inconsistent with this chapter.” This change 
superseded all common law duties and related case law a real estate agent 
would owe to their principals under the common law of agency.121 
The significant removal of the “to the extent inconsistent” language 
was treated as a “housekeeping” matter in the public testimony for HB 
1487, a similar bill that was not ultimately passed but under which most 
of the meaningful public testimony relating to SSB 5352 actually took 
place. Public testimony indicated that this bill merely clarified the existing 
relationships and duties under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 
and did not change the effect of the law as it was originally passed in 
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 117. See Jackowski v. Borchelt, 278 P.3d 1100 (Wash. 2012). 
 118. See Jackowski v. Borchelt, 209 P.3d 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 119. Id. at 520 (emphasis added). 
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1996.122 Further, the testimony indicated that the bill did not lessen the 
duties owed to consumers by brokers.123 The comment relating to duties 
not being lessened was likely referring to duties brokers owed to 
consumers after 1996 and not the duties brokers would owe to principals 
under the common law. 
The full effect of SSB 5352 removing the “to the extent not 
inconsistent” language is unclear. Washington courts have not 
significantly interpreted the scope of the statutory duties provided in 
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 since the 2013 amendment. 
Further, the legislature’s removal of the words “to the extent not 
inconsistent with this chapter” and the additional text stating that duties 
under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 are statutory in nature 
and not fiduciary seems to suggest that Washington’s case law interpreting 
such fiduciary duties is not applicable to interpreting these statutory duties. 
However, during public testimony, Representative Zack Hudgins 
stated that the bill would ideally capture all duties under common law and 
codify them as statutory duties.124 This statement, when combined with the 
public testimony that the bill would not lessen duties brokers owed, seems 
to suggest that agency case law is still useful and applicable in determining 
the scope of a broker’s duties. 
It is beyond peradventure, viewing in totality the legislative history 
of Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 since the legislature’s 1996 
introduction of these new statutory provisions, that the legislature has 
sought to favor commercial property owners and the commercial 
brokerage firms that serve as listing brokers for those properties. This was 
recognized by one real estate broker whose written testimony for a hearing 
was that “WAR is pushing agency regulation reform, primarily at the 
behest of the large big-city offices. But this particular legislation has not 
been shown to Realtors in general—the people who will have to deal with 
its effects daily.”125 This favoritism works to the significant disadvantage 
of tenants seeking commercial space in the marketplace, when the legal 
relationships of these disparate and adverse parties are viewed in the 
context of what came before that statute: a legal regime governed by the 
well-established and long-standing common law of principal and agent. 
Moreover, it would not be unreasonable to conclude, given the lack of 
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transparency as reflected in the dearth of documentation and lack of 
transcripts of meetings among special interests and legislators in the 
legislative history, that the legislators and special interests involved, 
including the commercial real estate services sector participants active in 
Washington in the Greater Seattle Area, Washington’s most-active 
commercial market, that these changes were intended to benefit large full-
service CRES firms to the detriment of commercial tenants. 
Additionally, beyond the above speculation—albeit well-reasoned—
regarding the business motivations prompting the enactment of and 
subsequent amendments to Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, a 
perplexing question remains unanswered for dual agency: When the 
legislature clearly did not want the duty of loyalty in its common law form 
to be present in the statutory framework, but also wanted agents to exercise 
some level of loyalty, how much loyalty does a broker owe to a client 
under the statutory scheme? And how can a dual agent take no action 
adverse to either party in the transaction during negotiations or at other 
stages of the representation? Then-Representative Cyrus Habib noted this 
conflict in a question during public testimony for SB 5352, but the 
question was not fully answered.126 Instead, the answer to this question 
appeared to conflate the duty to take no action adverse or detrimental to 
either side in a dual agency representation with the duty to not disclose 
confidential information and the duty to disclose a conflict.127 
This question is poorly, but partially answered, by the statute 
providing for the case of a commercial brokerage firm where two separate 
agents represent the commercial tenant and the commercial landlord. In 
this situation, the designated broker and the supervising managing 
broker(s) would be the dual agent(s).128 As such, the duty to take no action 
adverse to either party in the transaction would be likely be fulfilled by 
taking nearly no action. Yet, if the managing broker is actively 
supervising, it is likely that an individual will be faced with the same 
ethical issues with which a single dual agent representing both sides would 
be faced. 
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PART III 
Part I provided the context and market realities within which 
commercial real estate brokers and agents operate in 2019 under this 
statutory licensing scheme initially enacted by the legislature in 1968. Part 
II of this Article examined the status of the Law of Principal and Agent at 
the time Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 was enacted to 
supplant these common law principles, as well as the statute’s legislative 
history. Part III will explore the common law of Principal and Agent as 
applied to relevant real estate transactions in Washington, including a 
discussion of relevant case law; address various conflicts of interests 
prohibited under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86; and review 
potential remedies for violations of those prohibitions. 
A. Washington’s Common Law of Agency for Real Estate Brokers Prior 
to Being Superseded 
Before the legislature’s enactment of HB 1659, creating Revised 
Code of Washington section 18.86, Washington common law offered a 
comprehensive and very robust set of legal principles applying to the 
relationships of agents and principals, and governing the behaviors of 
agents towards their principals in instances where those behaviors run 
contrary to those principles. 
These common law duties an agent owes to a principal in the 
commercial real estate context, though superseded by Revised Code of 
Washington section 18.86, were, and continue to be despite being 
superseded, vital for tenants to receive the representation they need and 
expect in a commercial leasing context. To better understand the genuine 
importance of these common law duties, consider a relevant analogy: The 
relationship between a harried mother (the principal) seeking a specific 
gift her son has asked Santa to bring him for Christmas and the Macy’s 
Toy Department Santa (the agent). 
Devotees of Valentine Davies’ Miracle on 34th Street—not any of the 
disappointing remakes and not the version where they have added color, 
mind you—will already have recognized the movie from the above brief 
description of one of the pivotal scenes in the movie. For those unfamiliar 
with Miracle on 34th Street, Mr. Kris Kringle (Santa Clause) decides to 
live among us in New York City between Thanksgiving and Christmas 
Eve because he’s concerned about the annual evaporation of Christmas 
spirit and its deleterious impact on the holiday itself, which Mr. Kringle, 
of course, holds sacrosanct (naturally).129 Not having a plan for how he is 
going to blend in while in New York—as you might imagine, regardless 
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of how he dresses, he still looks very much like Santa Clause—Mr. 
Kringle opportunistically takes a job as the Toy Department Santa at the 
Flagship Macy’s on 34th Street in Manhattan after the Santa in the 
Christmas float for the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade is found quite 
inebriated.130 
In posing as Macy’s Toy Department Santa, Mr. Kringle quickly 
learns his job responsibilities focus primarily on hoodwinking young 
children sitting on Santa’s lap into desiring toys which are overstocked in 
the store. Mr. Kringle’s “Santa orientation” takes place in the employee 
locker room with Mr. Schelhammer, who heads Macy’s Toy 
Department.131 During this orientation, Mr. Schelhammer counsels Mr. 
Kringle in “how to be a good Santa,” and the audience unknowingly gets 
a lesson in the Law of Principal and Agent.132 
As soon as Mr. Schelhammer departs the locker room, Alfred, the 
janitor, offers a brief soliloquy on the perils of “bad isms,” with 
“commercialism” being the “woist,” in his very thick Brooklyn accent. On 
the one hand, in his role as the Macy’s Toy Department Santa, Mr. Kringle 
owes Mr. Schelhammer a duty of loyalty to follow the direction to 
hoodwink children.133 On the other hand, Kris Kringle has a competing 
duty to serve Christmas, and at the behest of Alfred, Mr. Kringle clearly 
rejects the notion of serving Mr. Schelhammer at the expense of 
Christmas, thereby rejecting being the principal in a principal-and-agent 
relationship. 
In the second, seminal but subtler scene from Miracle on 34th Street 
with lessons on the Law of Principal and Agent, Mr. Kringle is chatting 
with Peter, who is sitting on his lap and telling Santa that he wants a red 
fire engine that squirts real water (which Peter promises Santa he’ll never 
use inside the house).134 Meanwhile, Peter’s mother (played to perfection 
by Martha Raye), who has steadfastly remained within earshot of this 
otherwise charming exchange, is doing her best to clandestinely signal to 
Santa that she’s been all over Manhattan and no one sells the coveted red 
fire engine.135 Imagine her shocked exasperation when, despite her efforts 
to get Santa to persuade Peter that he’d like a different toy for Christmas, 
Mr. Kringle promises Peter that red fire engine is precisely what he’ll be 
getting for Christmas.136 When Peter’s mother sends him off to the side 
because she “wants to have a word with Santa Clause,” she dresses Mr. 
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Kringle down for promising Peter a toy that doesn’t exist in New York 
City.137 To her complete dismay, Mr. Kringle pulls a small notebook out 
of his red suit, opens it up, and let’s Peter’s mother know she “can get that 
fire truck, at Schoenfeld’s on Lexington Avenue,” and for a great price, 
which he quotes. 
Still flabbergasted by Mr. Kringle unselfishly sending her to another 
store to get precisely what her son wants for Christmas, Peter’s mother 
buttonholes Mr. Schelhammer in the Macy’s Toy Department, who is 
equally flabbergasted because he has just witnessed first-hand Mr. Kringle 
sending a number of Macy’s customers to other stores, including arch rival 
Gimbel’s across the street, to find precisely what they want.138 This scene 
sets up the central narrative of the movie, with Mr. Macy deciding to 
implement Mr. Kringle’s policy of “giving customers exactly what they 
want” storewide and, eventually, nationwide.139 
So what exactly do these scenes have to do with commercial leasing, 
the common law of principal and agent, and Revised Code of Washington 
section 18.86? Plenty. In the first scene recalled above, where Mr. 
Schelhammer is instructing Kris Kringle on “how to be a good Santa,” his 
guidance is much like the relationship between a tenant representative and 
a listing broker in a full-service CRES firm. It is incumbent on the tenant 
representative to help the listing broker to lease the empty building spaces 
in the building(s) of the landlord who has hired the full-service brokerage 
firm, just as Mr. Schelhammer needs his agent, Kris Kringle, to help 
Macy’s empty out their overstocked inventory of toys for Christmas. In 
Mr. Schelhammer’s world, just as in that of the listing agent, the most 
important duty is to the firm—not the customer. 
In the second scene recalled above, Kris Kringle demonstrates what 
all prospective tenants want and believe they have a right to expect in the 
principal and agent relationship entered into between a client and a 
commercial leasing agent: that the agent is going to represent the principal 
objectively, professionally, and diligently, exercising a duty of undivided 
loyalty with an exclusive focus on securing a premises and on terms that 
are all in the tenant’s best interests. No self-dealing; no hidden agenda; 
and no serving another master, disclosed or otherwise, other than the 
client. This is what the common law of principal and agent commands, this 
is what tenants expect in commercial leasing transactions, and this is how 
commercial leasing should operate every time, in every transaction. 
Given the intention of the Washington State Legislature to replace 
the common law duties agents owe their principals in 1996 through the 
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passage of House Bill 1659, codified as Revised Code of Washington 
section 18.86, Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., which was decided in 1997 on 
facts existing prior to the effective date of the statute, offers one of the best 
expositions of Washington’s common law duties as they existed prior to 
being superseded by statute.140 And the dissenting opinion of Justice Philip 
A. Talmadge, in which Chief Justice Durham and Justice Alexander 
concurred, contains much of this exposition.141 Sing involved John L. Scott 
representing both a prospective buyer, Sing, and a seller, with a third John 
L. Scott agent competing with, and ultimately prevailing over the 
prospective buyer.142 The majority viewed this as a case where the firm’s 
primary fiduciary duties were owed to the seller, with any duties owed to 
the prospective buyer, Sing, being secondary.143 The relevant facts of the 
case and majority decision are addressed in greater detail later in this 
Article under the analysis of relevant cases. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Talmadge deviated from the 
majority’s view principally by viewing the facts presented as 
fundamentally an “insider-trading” or self-dealing case.144 He then 
proceeded to apply the fact pattern to the common law and statutory duties 
an agent owes its principal, as well as to the general duties that real estate 
brokers and agents owe to the integrity of the marketplace.145 His 
perspective embraced the notion that without the commitment and 
obligations of real estate brokers and agents to the integrity of the 
marketplace, the entire marketplace would collapse because the 
participants that the marketplace is intended to serve—prospective sellers 
and purchasers—could have no reasonable expectations of the integrity of 
each transaction in that marketplace.146 Justice Talmadge also made an 
argument regarding the fiduciary duties of all parties to contractual 
arrangements of good faith and fair dealing.147 In making these arguments 
against the majority opinion and in favor of a different outcome 
determined by the Supreme Court of Washington, Justice Talmadge relied 
on three seminal cases as precedent supporting his dissenting opinion: 
Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau;148 Cantwell v. Nunn;149 and Badgett v. 
Security State Bank.150 
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B. Common Law Fiduciary Duties Real Estate Brokers Owe Their 
Principals 
In his dissenting opinion in Sing, Justice Talmadge cited Mersky v. 
Multiple Listing Bureau for its statements about the fiduciary duties of real 
estate brokers, which in the commercial leasing context would be owed to 
prospective tenants if the broker represented the tenant.151 Specifically in 
this regard, Justice Talmadge quoted from the Mersky case as follows: 
[T]here flows from this agency relationship [of a property owner and 
the listing broker] and its accompanying obligation of utmost fidelity 
and good faith, the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility on the part 
of the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to exercise reasonable 
care, skill, and judgment in securing for the principal the best bargain 
possible; to scrupulously avoid representing any interest antagonistic 
to that of the principal in transactions involving the principal’s listed 
property, . . . to make, in all instances, a full, fair, and timely 
disclosure to the principal of all facts within the knowledge or coming 
to the attention of the broker or his subagents which are, or may be, 
material in connection with the matter for which the broker is 
employed, and which might affect the principal’s rights and interests 
or influence his actions.152 
Intentionally excluded from the above excerpt from Justice 
Talmadge’s dissenting opinion is the common law prohibition against a 
broker and its “subagents” engaging in self-dealing with regard to the 
principal’s property entrusted to the broker. This was a significant aspect 
in the Sing case, and is omitted here only because it is taken up separately 
in the section of this Article addressing situations in which, through the 
broker’s ownership of other properties and property interests, a broker may 
be engaging in self-dealing to the broker’s benefit and potentially to the 
tenant client’s detriment without the latter’s advance knowledge and 
consent in the dual agency context.153 
The duties highlighted in the Sing case are fundamentally the same 
duties an agent owes its principal as stated in in the Restatement (Third) 
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of Agency,154 as well as in the 2014 Conflicts of Interest research study 
report: unbroken service and loyalty (also referred to as the “duty of 
undivided loyalty”); confidentiality; full disclosure of information to allow 
well-informed decisions by the principal; acting in the best interest of the 
client; reasonable care and diligence; and accountability to the principal. 
It is difficult to imagine a set of principles, rules, regulations, or 
statutory provisions that would better protect a principal in an agency 
relationship. Yet in enacting, and then subsequently amending, Revised 
Code of Washington section 18.86, the Washington State Legislature has 
consistently eroded the scope and extent of these common law protections 
previously afforded commercial tenants in their business relationships 
with their real estate brokers. 
In challenging the court’s majority in Sing, Justice Talmadge also 
took specific note of statutory precedent under the Washington State 
Legislature’s 1941 Real Estate Brokers and Salespersons Act that said it 
was supposed “to protect the general public from negligent, unscrupulous, 
or dishonest real estate operators.”155 Justice Talmadge concluded that the 
agent of the real estate brokerage firm engaged to market and sell, as the 
“listing broker” or record for the property owner’s home, who purchased 
that home using information only available to that agent as a consequence 
of her employment with and by the listing broker, violated both common 
law fiduciary duties and statutory duties under Washington law.156 Justice 
Talmadge determined that the agent of the listing broker, in participating 
in the transaction for her own and her husband’s personal interests, “had a 
statutory duty to conduct herself in a way free of bad faith, dishonesty, or 
untrustworthiness. She owed this duty both to the [sellers and the 
aggrieved, potential buyer of seller’s home].”157 
C. The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Common Contract 
Law 
Beyond both the fiduciary duties of agents to their principals under 
Washington common law applicable to the broker and its agents in the 
Sing case, as well as the existing statutory duties of agents to their 
principals under the state’s applicable statutes, parties owe general duties 
of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship. Justice 
Talmadge’s dissenting opinion invited the majority’s attention to these 
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common law contract principles applicable to the questionable 
transactions the broker and its agents entered into, or allowed to transpire, 
to the detriment of the plaintiff, and potentially to the detriment of the 
seller of the property. Had the interested buyers been encouraged or even 
allowed to compete for the purchase of the seller’s property, the final sales 
price might well have been greater than the sales price reflected in the final 
purchase contract between the seller and the agent of the listing broker 
acting in her own interests. Specifically, Justice Talmadge noted that under 
common law principles of contract, in this instance applicable because the 
property owner had a signed contract with the listing broker, the latter, and 
by extension to the broker’s agents, were subject to the “implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in every contract.”158 
D. The Duty of Undivided Loyalty: How Washington Case Law Has 
Interpreted a Broker’s Duty of Loyalty to a Client at Common Law and 
Under Revised Code of Washington Section 18.86 
The fact that the professional practice of real estate representation 
has been governed since the enactment of HB 1659 in 1996 
notwithstanding, understanding how Washington courts have interpreted 
and applied the common law of Principal and Agent to specific fact 
patterns is critical to understanding how the common law principles 
applied to the representation of principals by agents prior to Revised Code 
of Washington section 18.86, and equally as critical to understanding how 
the duties and obligations agents owe to their principals changed 
fundamentally under the new statutory licensure and regulatory scheme. 
E. Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau 
In Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, Alyce Thompson, a broker, 
represented the sellers of a home.159 The house was listed for $39,750, and 
the sellers rejected an offer of $32,500.160 Mrs. Thompson then showed 
the property to her sister and brother-in-law, who offered $33,000.161 Mrs. 
Thompson urged the seller to accept the offer and advised the sellers that 
accepting the offer would be wise, even though it would mean a financial 
loss for the sellers.162 The sellers accepted the offer and the deal closed.163 
Sometime later, after the buyers made improvements to the property, the 
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property was resold for $46,000.164 The sellers sued the broker alleging 
that the failure to disclose kinship ties to the purchaser amounted to a 
breach of the duty of loyalty.165 
The Washington Supreme Court held that such failure to disclose 
kinship ties amounted to fraud in law or constructive fraud because the 
agent had a duty of undivided loyalty to the principal.166 This constructive 
fraud would exist regardless of whether the broker could show that the 
breach was not intentional or deliberate.167 The court reasoned that the 
remedy for such a breach was “to rescind the transaction, recover any 
profit gained by the broker from the transaction, or recoup the commission 
paid to the broker by virtue of the transaction.”168 In support of this 
holding, the court reasoned that the purpose behind the rule and the 
remedies was the following: 
The rule and the available remedies, instead, are designed as much to 
prevent fraud as to redress it, and follow directly upon the heels of 
the broker’s deliberate or innocent failure to timely and fully disclose 
to his principal the fact of the interdicted relationship, for the reason 
that the very existence of the relationship may have corroded the 
broker’s obligation of undivided loyalty, may have been a material 
circumstance to the principal, or may have affected his actions or 
decisions in the course of the transaction involved.169 
The court noted that this principle was recognized in Hay v. Long, 
where an agent leased a principal’s property to the agent’s wife.170 The 
court also noted that Frissel v. Newman implemented this principle.171 The 
Frissel court discussed a real estate agent’s “duty to fully inform his 
principal of the indirect acquisition by a subagent of an interest in the listed 
property.”172 
F. Sing v. John L. Scott 
In Sing v. John L. Scott, the Rudds listed residential property through 
Jody Prongay, an agent of John L. Scott, a residential brokerage firm 
licensed as such in Washington.173 The plaintiff, Sing, was represented by 
Bob Pennock, another agent of the John L. Scott residential brokerage. 
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Sing saw the Rudds’ listed property and put in an offer for $41,000 through 
his agent, Pennock.174 In response to Sing’s offer, the Rudds sent a 
counteroffer at $45,000 with other changes.175 Sing stated he would sign 
the counteroffer, but also that he was going out of town and would prefer 
to sign it on Sunday evening.176 On Sunday, yet another agent with the 
John L. Scott firm, Maureen Buckley, along with her husband, put in an 
offer for the listed property at $42,000 with a shorter feasibility study time 
and sooner closing date than Sing’s offer.177 Prongay, the Rudds’ agent, 
called Pennock, Sing’s agent, to ask whether the counteroffer had been 
accepted, and Pennock informed Prongay that Sing had not yet come back 
into town.178 Prongay informed Pennock that the sellers would be 
withdrawing their still extant counteroffer to Sing, inasmuch as it had yet 
to be accepted. In response to learning this new information, the Rudds, 
who had access to the listing agent’s files and may have reviewed the 
history of the offers previously made on the house, presented an offer of 
purchase to the Buckleys at $45,000, which was accepted.179 
Among other claims, Sing sued John L. Scott and the Buckleys for 
violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA).180 The jury 
returned a verdict finding John L. Scott, instead of the Buckleys, in 
violation of the CPA.181 The appellate court, in upholding the jury verdict, 
reasoned that the jury could infer: “(1) that Buckley had access to the 
listing file for the Rudd property, (2) that Buckley had seen the Sing offer, 
and (3) that Buckley had an unfair advantage over Sing because she could 
craft her offer so it was slightly more appealing than Sing’s offer.”182 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed. Under the common law of 
agency in Washington, it reasoned that John L. Scott’s primary fiduciary 
duty was to the seller. This reasoning was despite the undivided duty of 
loyalty an agent owed to its principal. As such, any duty to keep a buyer’s 
offer confidential could not be reconciled with a broker’s duty to obtain 
for the seller the best possible deal, and the duty to the seller took 
precedence.183 
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In a strongly worded dissent,184 Justice Talmadge opined that there 
were breaches of duties amounting to self-dealing.185 Alternatively, the 
dissent argued that a fraud on the market theory could be applied to this 
fact pattern.186 The fraud being the misappropriation of Sing’s confidential 
information for the benefit of a John L. Scott agent.187 
Although Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 was not in 
effect at the time of the agency relationship in Sing v. John L. Scott, the 
court seemed to imply that the statute would have made a difference under 
this fact pattern.188 
G. Jackowski v. Borchelt 
In Jackowski v. Borchelt, Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase 
purchased a home from David and Robin Borchelt in 2014.189 The parties 
were represented by separate brokerages.190 In 2016, the Jackowski and 
Takase’s home was damaged by a landslide, and the Jackowskis sued the 
Borchelts for rescission of the contract, or alternatively for fraud, 
fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of 
contract.191 The Jackowskis sued the brokers, alleging similar fraud-based 
claims including breach of common law fiduciary duties related to the 
property being in a landslide zone.192 The trial court dismissed most of the 
claims on summary judgment, with the exception of fraudulent 
concealment claims based on the sellers and the sellers’ broker allegedly 
covering cracks in the foundation with carpet.193 The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, with the exception of statutory and 
common law breach of fiduciary duty.194 
The Washington Supreme Court partially reversed the court of 
appeals, holding, in part, that sufficient evidence existed to survive 
summary judgment as to whether the brokers violated Washington’s 
statutory duty to refer clients to experts for matters beyond the scope of 
the broker’s expertise. Notably, the court recognized that Washington had 
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superseded common law fiduciary duties. In support of its reasoning, the 
court interpreted Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 as allowing 
a dual agent broker to take actions that may not be in one of the principal’s 
best interests.195 This is despite Revised Code of Washington section 
18.86.060(a), which prohibits dual agent brokers from taking any action 
that is adverse or detrimental to either party’s interest in a transaction. 
H. Vertical World v. Colliers International 
In Vertical World, Colliers International acted as a dual agent, with 
an agent from the firm representing Vertical World and an agent from the 
firm representing the commercial property owner, Jack Lothrop.196 
Lothrop moved to evict his tenant, Big Bear, in September 1996, and hired 
a broker from Colliers International to list the property that same month. 
Vertical World learned of the property in January 1997 and put in a 
proposal on January 31st.197 Lothrop countered on February 5th and 
renovations began on March 4th, a month before closing.198 However, 
Vertical World alleged that if the agent had informed Vertical World about 
the property four months earlier, when it first went on the market, they 
would not have needed to spend extra money accelerating construction and 
extending memberships while its Fremont location was undergoing 
renovations.199 
Although this case arose from a summary judgment motion, the facts 
give rise to a conflict of duties. Lothrop testified that although he was 
evicting the prior tenant, he was giving them some grace because he hoped 
they would be bought out or be able to come up with the past due rents, 
and he testified that he asked his agent to slow down on showing the 
building in the fall of 1996.200 Finally, Lothrop testified that he would not 
have considered leasing the property to Vertical World until January 
1997.201 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Colliers 
International.202 
The court noted that there was equivocal evidence that suggested 
Lothrop may have leased the building to Vertical World earlier.203 As such, 
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the court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for a 
trial.204 However, no trial took place and the parties settled.205 
The seller appears to have asked his agent to take a slow approach to 
marketing the property in the fall but did not ask the agent to take the 
property off the market, which is what the claim of injury arises from. 
Because the property was still on the market, the interests of the landlord 
in taking a slow approach to marketing the property were placed in direct 
conflict with the interests of the ultimate tenant, Vertical World. By 
executing the landlord’s wishes, Colliers International arguably took 
action to the detriment of Vertical World in contravention of the statutory 
duties provided by Revised Code of Washington section 18.86. 
I. Potential Remedies for Conflicts of Interest Violating  
a Commercial Real Estate Broker’s Duties Under  
Revised Code of Washington Section 18.86 
1. Prohibitions Against Conflicts of Interest Under Revised Code of 
Washington Section 18.86 
A number of provisions exist within Washington’s statutory broker 
duty scheme addressing, directly or indirectly, conflicts of interest when 
representing tenants or buyers. The duties a broker owes to a principal 
under Washington’s statutory scheme vary depending on whether the 
broker is acting as a dual agent, or solely as a buyer or selling agent. 
Regardless of which side the broker represents, among other duties, the 
broker must deal honestly and in good faith, present all written offers in a 
timely manner, and “disclose in writing to all parties to whom the broker 
renders real estate brokerage services, before the party signs an offer in a 
real estate transaction handled by the broker.”206 However, an agent may 
not act as a dual agent until a broker has received “written consent of both 
parties to the transaction,” and the “consent must include a statement of 
the terms of compensation.”207 
As a buyer or tenant’s agent a broker additionally has the following 
relevant duties:  
(a) [t]o be loyal to the buyer by taking no action that is adverse or 
detrimental to the buyer’s interest in a transaction;  
(b) [t]o timely disclose to the buyer any conflicts of interest;  
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. . . [and]  
(d) [n]ot to disclose any confidential information from or about the 
buyer, except under subpoena or court order, even after termination 
of the agency relationship[.]208 
However, when a broker is acting as a dual agent, the relevant duties 
are as follows:  
(a) [t]o take no action that is adverse or detrimental to either party’s 
interest in a transaction;  
(b) [t]o timely disclose to both parties any conflicts of interest;  
. . . [and] 
(d) [n]ot to disclose any confidential information from or about either 
party, except under subpoena or court order, even after termination 
of the agency relationship.209 
Notably, the “loyalty” framing that is present in the buyer or tenant’s 
agent duties is not present in the dual agent’s duties. 
Although The Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 establishes 
duties brokers owe to principals, superseding the common law, it does not 
provide any causes of action for breach of those duties. As such, “common 
law tort causes of action remain the vehicle through which a party may 
recover for a breach of statutory duties set forth in chapter 18.86 RCW.”210 
Even though the legislature amended Revised Code of Washington section 
18.86 in 2013, one year after Jackowski v. Borchelt, stating that a broker’s 
duties are statutory only and that the common law relating to the duties 
was entirely superseded, Jackowski is likely still applicable in this respect 
because the statute only supersedes the fiduciary duties, not the common 
law entirely.211 
Thus, the statutory scheme supplies the duty underlying common law 
torts claims such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation. However, these 
common law torts are limited by the scope of the duty supplied in the 
statute. For example, a claim of negligent misrepresentation flowing from 
the breach of a broker’s duty can be made, but the claim is limited by the 
statute providing the broker owes no duty “to independently verify the 
                                                     
 208. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.050(1) (2019). 
  209. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.86.060(2)(a)–(b), (d) (2019). 
 210. Jackowski v. Borchelt, 278 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Wash. 2012). 
 211. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.86.110 (2019) (“The common law continues to apply to the parties 
in all other respects.”). 
210 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:169 
accuracy or completeness of any statement made . . . by any source 
reasonably believed by the broker to be reliable.”212 
J. Fraud 
A claim for common law fraud can be made in Washington upon 
showing all nine elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 
These are as follows: (1) “a representation of an existing fact”; (2) “its 
materiality”; (3) “its falsity”; (4) “the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity”; 
(5) “[the speaker’s] intent that it shall be acted upon by the person to whom 
it is made”; (6) “ignorance of its falsity on the part of the person to whom 
it is addressed”; (7) “the latter’s reliance on the truth of the 
representation”; (8) “his [or her] right to rely upon it”; (9) “and his [or her] 
consequent damage.”213 The duty not to commit fraud is not a fiduciary 
duty and thus is not superseded by statute in Washington. Fraud requires 
a showing that the speaker knew the statement was false, which can be 
difficult to prove if there is no physical evidence showing the speaker’s 
knowledge or when a motion to dismiss is granted before discovery allows 
the uncovering of information that would show knowledge. 
K. Constructive Fraud 
Prior to Washington’s codification of broker duties in statute, a 
doctrine of constructive fraud existed where a failure to disclose a broker’s 
interest, or a kinship relationship between the broker and the property 
owner, amounted to constructive fraud.214 This doctrine has not been cited 
with respect to a real estate broker in a Washington since the enactment of 
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 in 1996, but no case law has 
stated that the doctrine has been superseded by statute. Given that brokers 
still have a duty to disclose conflicts of interest under Revised Code of 
Washington section 18.86, it is possible that such a claim for constructive 
fraud still exists despite the statute superseding common law duties; 
however, there remains uncertainty as to whether it would be seen as a 
valid claim. 
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L. Fraudulent Concealment 
A failure to disclose a material fact constitutes fraudulent 
concealment when the individual had a duty to disclose the fact.215 
Although claims of fraudulent concealment are most commonly analyzed 
from the standpoint of the seller or landlord, real estate brokers are also 
subject to fraudulent concealment claims when they had independent 
knowledge of the defect.216 This tort is also equally applicable to 
commercial properties.217 The duty to disclose information arises when (1) 
the property has a concealed defect; (2) the seller, landlord, or agent has 
knowledge of the defect; “(3) the defect presents a danger to the property, 
health, or life of the purchaser; (4) the defect is unknown to the purchaser; 
and (5) the defect would not be disclosed by a careful, reasonable 
inspection by the purchaser.”218 Fraudulent concealment, similar to fraud, 
requires a showing of knowledge on the part of the seller. Also, the 
requirement that the defect would not be disclosed by careful, reasonable 
inspection can be a barrier for some claims when, in hindsight, a more 
thorough inspection should have been done. 
M. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Two types of negligent misrepresentation exist in Washington tort 
case law, an affirmative misstatement and a failure to disclose. The two 
often share the same label of negligent misrepresentation in case law, 
despite the two claims possessing different elements. The tort of negligent 
misrepresentation has been applied to commercial brokers in 
Washington.219 
N. Negligent Affirmative Misstatements 
An affirmative misstatement requires showing that (1) the broker 
supplied information to guide the principal that was false, (2) the broker 
knew or should have known that the information was supplied to guide the 
business transaction, (3) the broker was negligent in obtaining or 
communicating the false information, (4) the principal relied on the false 
information, (5) the reliance was reasonable, and (6) the false information 
proximately caused damages to the principal.220 However, as noted above, 
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brokers are exempt from verifying the accuracy of information obtained 
from sources they deem trustworthy. 
O. Negligent failure to disclose 
To establish negligent misrepresentation under a failure to disclose 
theory, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the broker had a duty to disclose 
information, (2) such information was not disclosed, (3) the broker was 
negligent in failing to disclose such information, (4) had the information 
been disclosed, the principal would have acted differently, and (5) the 
principal was damaged by the failure to disclose the information.221 
P. Washington Consumer Protection Act 
A principal must establish five elements to prevail on a claim against 
a broker or firm under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The 
principal must establish: an “(1) unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) 
occurring in trade or commerce, (3) public interest impact, (4) injury to 
plaintiff in his or her business or property, and (5) causation.”222 
For the first element, the deceptive act or practice must have the 
capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.223 The act cannot be 
an isolated incident affecting an individual but rather must have the 
potential to deceive others. However, this element can be met by a broker 
or firm marketing or showing a property while engaging in the deceptive 
behavior.224 
The third element, the public interest impact, requires showing a 
likelihood that additional plaintiffs have been or will be injured in the same 
manner. A factor test has been established for this element, with no single 
factor being necessary or most important. The factors are as follows: “(1) 
whether the acts were committed in the course of defendant’s business, (2) 
whether the defendants advertised to the public, (3) whether the defendant 
actively solicited the plaintiff, and (4) whether the parties occupied 
unequal bargaining positions.”225 This factor test may be particularly 
difficult to meet in a commercial setting because, even if a dual agent is 
involved, parties may often be deemed more sophisticated and have equal 
bargaining positions, though many commercial tenants are not as 
sophisticated as commonly misconceived to be. 
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Another potential theory that can satisfy the requirements of the CPA 
is fraud on the market, as introduced by the dissent in Sing v. John L. 
Scott.226 However, this theory has not been adopted by Washington case 
law nor analyzed after the 2013 amendment to the broker liability statute. 
Under this theory, the unfair or deceptive practice is the misappropriation 
of the principal’s confidential information for the agent’s distinct 
advantage.227 Self-dealing can constitute fraud on the market if the self-
dealing uses confidential information for the agent or firm’s distinct 
advantage.228 
Regardless of the claim, the principal must prove damages, which 
can be especially difficult in a commercial leasing context. The most likely 
harm that could result from a dual agency representation in a commercial 
leasing context is not getting the best deal possible; however, proving that 
a better deal would have resulted is incredibly difficult, especially when 
the landlord could simply testify that the deal the tenant received was the 
best the landlord would have agreed to. However, when damages can be 
quantified, a tenant could recover for breach of broker duties in tort or 
under the CPA. 
PART IV 
Part I provided the context and market realities relevant to the issue 
of conflicts of interest in commercial brokerage under Washington law, 
focusing on Greater Seattle. Part II examined the Law of Principal and 
Agent impacting commercial brokerage, as well as the statutes’ legislative 
history of the statute that supplants the common law with a statutory 
licensing regime. Part III explored the common law of Principal and Agent 
as applied in relevant Washington real estate transactions, including an 
exposition of relevant case law, addressing various conflicts of interests 
prohibited under Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, and 
reviewed potential remedies for violations of those prohibitions. Finally, 
in Part IV the Article examines the emerging trend of brokers being 
principals or fiduciary managers for properties they broker, fundamentally 
changing the nature of their conflicts of interest, and addressing the legal 
implications of a broker being an undisclosed principal in a transaction 
they broker after Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, and 
concludes with the importance of a return to the status quo: reinstating 
common law fiduciary duties in commercial real estate transactions for the 
benefit and protection of all commercial tenants and to ensure the integrity 
of the market and of all future commercial real estate transactions. 
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A. CRES Firms Have Increasingly Become Principals in the 
Transactions They Broker in Washington 
Large CRES firms are increasingly taking ownership interests in 
commercial real estate or managing investment funds creating fiduciary 
management roles for the firm as to commercial real estate. These 
ownership interests and fiduciary relationships typically arise from a 
purchase or acquisition of a property, management of the investments of 
others, and from sponsoring investment opportunities where a firm invests 
its funds alongside the funds of its investors. This sponsorship also takes 
place in the development context where a firm developing a property will 
partner with an investor by contributing its own funds to the project. 
As firms expand their commercial development businesses and their 
investment management businesses, the likelihood that a firm will be a 
principal in a transaction they broker, either through an ownership interest 
or as a fiduciary, will continue to increase. This is also true for dual agency 
situations where the firm could represent both parties and have an 
ownership interest or be a fiduciary manager of the property. 
The firms engaged in this practice tend to have separate ownership 
structures for the real estate and investment arms. Often the firm owning 
the real estate or managing the funds will be a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the CRES firm. When firms comingle assets with investors, further 
companies may be created to hold such property. This separation can make 
it difficult to identify exactly how prevalent and how frequently firms are 
principals in the transactions they broker. 
Firms vary on the amount of separation between the CRES firm and 
the subsidiary managing investments or developing property. For 
example, JLL’s investment management subsidiary, LaSalle, indicates 
that JLL may “from time to time . . . provide services to assets in LaSalle 
funds in the ordinary course of business.”229 Similarly, CBRE’s 
investment management subsidiary, CBRE Global Investors, has a policy 
of putting its clients above those of CBRE and CBRE must compete with 
other service providers.230 Additionally, CBRE states that it “does not 
engage in favoritism for the benefit of its Subsidiary.”231 However, 
CBRE’s development arm, Trammell Crow, receives a discount on CBRE 
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brokerage services,232 ensuring that CBRE will more likely be chosen over 
other competitors to represent Trammell Crow. 
The practice of a CRES firm having an ownership interest or 
fiduciary management relationship with a property it is brokering has 
continued to become more prevalent since the 2014 Conflicts of Interest 
Research Report was published. CBRE currently has approximately 5 
billion square feet of space under management.233 This square footage is 
nearly three times higher than it was in 2013.234 And Hughes Marino 
estimates CBRE either owns or is a fiduciary manager of 2.5 billion square 
feet of commercial space.235 Put in perspective, the western half of the 
United States only has about 2.4 billion square feet of office space.236 This 
value, in part, reflects the $107 billion in assets CBRE Global Investors 
has under management.237 To its credit, CBRE does have a policy to 
disclose such conflicts and obtains consent when it or a subsidiary “owns” 
the property, though it does not define what constitutes “ownership” and 
it is not clear that a sponsored investment fund or a subsidiary comingling 
funds and creating a separate entity would constitute ownership under 
CBRE’s definition. It is also unclear what procedures and protocols CBRE 
has in place to self-monitor whether it is meeting the intent and letter of 
this policy, such that it is possible the policy is intended primarily to put 
investors at ease about how the company is addressing conflicts of interest 
as a Risk Factor in its SEC reporting documents.238 
JLL has similarly continued to increase its presence as a fiduciary 
manager of real estate assets. LaSalle, JLL’s investment arm, currently has 
$60.1 billion in assets under management,239 of which $376.2 million are 
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LaSalle’s own funds.240 In 2013, LaSalle only had $47.6 billion in assets 
under management.241 
This practice is not limited to CBRE and JLL. Instead, Newmark 
Knight Frank and Colliers International have moved in this direction as 
well. Newmark Knight Frank owns a controlling interest in Newmark 
Holdings, which was recently renamed GFP Real Estate.242 GFP Real 
Estate is one of the largest holders of real estate in New York.243 Similarly, 
Colliers International recently acquired Harrison Street, an investment 
management firm.244 
These increasing incidents of ownership and fiduciary responsibility 
also appear in the development services full-service CRES firms may 
offer. For example, CBRE’s development arm and real estate investment 
arm is a wholly owned subsidiary called Trammell Crow. Trammell Crow 
develops properties for others. In addition, it will sometimes partner with 
investors and clients by contributing its own funds for projects, while 
purchasing and developing property for profit on occasion with only its 
own funds.245 An example of this is Trammell Crow’s recent purchase of 
a development site in Washington, D.C. for $12 million.246 
CBRE and Trammell Crow were recently the subject of a lawsuit 
where CBRE represented both Trammell Crow, the owner of the property, 
and the government seeking to lease the property.247 In this case, CBRE 
properly disclosed both the dual agency and the ownership conflict to the 
government, and the government consented to the representation 
continuing upon finding that the organizational conflict of interest had 
been mitigated.248 Although the court found the appellant failed to show 
that an unmitigated organizational conflict of interest existed with respect 
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to Trammell Crow and CBRE,249 this case represents how increasingly 
common it is for a large CRES firm to have an ownership interest or a 
fiduciary management relationship with a property it is acting as a dual 
broker for. 
B. The Legal Implications of a Broker as an Undisclosed Principal in a 
Commercial Real Estate Transaction 
Reiterating from the Abstract, Washington common law principles 
of the Law of Principal and Agent are instructive here. The problems 
associated with dual agency have become more acute and more pervasive 
in the world of commercial real estate generally, and in commercial 
leasing transactions in particular. Under the common law, an agent would 
owe the following duties to its principal: 
 Unbroken service and loyalty (the “duty of undivided loyalty”); 
 Confidentiality; 
 Full disclosure of information necessary for the principal to 
make well-informed decisions; 
 Acting in the best interest of the principal; 
 Reasonable care and diligence; and 
 Accountability to the principal. 
It seems beyond peradventure that a commercial real estate 
professional holding herself out as a tenant’s representative of an agent 
serving a tenant as principal, who is, in fact, an undisclosed principal in 
the transaction to which that agent has steered the principal, is in direct 
violation of more than half of the above common law duties an agent owes 
to its principal. In fact, other than the duty of confidentiality, in discharge 
of which the agent must maintain the confidentiality of the principal’s 
information, the actions of the agent serving its own interests appears to 
violate the five remaining common law duties: undivided loyalty; full 
disclosure; acting in the principal’s best interests; reasonable care and 
diligence, and accountability to the principal. Justice Talmadge’s 
dissenting opinion in Sing, cited above in Part II, made clear how an agent 
breaches their common law duties to its principal when that agent acts in 
its own selfish interests, and not in the interests of the agent’s principal. 
Referring to the extensive hypothetical scenarios presented in the 
2014 Conflicts of Interest study, it is hard to fathom how full disclosure of 
an agent’s conflicts of interest and securing the principal’s advance, 
informed written consent serves to actually protect the principal’s best 
interests. Moreover, and perhaps more to the point, a principal’s advance 
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written consent to accept a dual agency representation constitutes a waiver 
of the principal’s enforcement rights under other recovery theories, such 
as in tort, as described above, under a theory similar to that of contributory 
negligence. 
It seems a principal’s waiver of such fundamental rights as those 
owed by an agent to its principal is an intentionally self-destructive act to 
that principal’s best interests, tantamount to a statement by the principal 
that “I am aware I am entering into a relationship in which my agent owes 
me no fiduciary duties whatsoever and accept, in advance, any 
consequences adverse to my interests that follow from this flawed 
relationship.” Perhaps if the necessary written waiver was cast in such 
stark terms, more principals would better comprehend the potential, 
inevitably adverse consequences of accepting a dual agency relationship, 
and refuse to consent as a consequence. 
Further, when an agent acts in its own interests in a transaction in 
which it owes fiduciary duties to its principal in that transaction, the broker 
is held to an imputed knowledge standard, and is also held to higher 
standards of conduct than the standard fiduciary duties an agent owes to a 
principal at common law.250 Although this imputed knowledge standard 
was altered by Revised Code of Washington section 18.86.100, the statute 
merely limits a broker’s imputed knowledge of facts known by a sub-agent 
to those actually known by the broker and does not change imputed 
knowledge for managing and supervising brokers.251 This was the fact 
pattern in the Sing case, where three agents, all working under the same 
brokerage firm that also served as the listing broker for the seller, with one 
agent acting as the agent for a prospective buyer and another acting solely 
in the interest of herself and her husband.252 Although the majority opinion 
largely disregarded the conflict of interests present in the facts, Judge 
Talmadge’s dissenting opinion addressed this aspect of the facts in far 
greater detail with a scathing analysis of the “self-dealing” of the agent 
who used her access to otherwise confidential information regarding an 
extant counteroffer from the aggrieved, prospective purchaser to gain an 
advantage in making a competing offer for the same property on terms the 
self-dealing agent knew would be attractive to the sellers.253 
Relying on Mersky, Justice Talmadge stated, in pertinent part, that 
[F]rom this agency relationship [between a property owner seeking 
to list and sell its property and a listing broker,] springs the duty and 
the obligation upon the part of the listing broker, as well as on the 
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part of his subagents, to exercise the utmost good faith and fidelity 
toward his principal, the seller, in all matters falling within the scope 
of his employment. . . . [And] there flows from this agency 
relationship and its accompanying obligation of utmost fidelity and 
good faith, the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility on the part of 
the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to exercise reasonable 
care, skill, and judgment . . . ; to scrupulously avoid representing any 
interest antagonistic to that of the principal in transactions involving 
the principal’s listed property, or otherwise self-dealing with that 
property, without the explicit and fully informed consent of the 
principal . . . .254 
Justice Talmadge’s dissenting opinion went on to note, by way of 
excerpt from the Cantwell decision: 
The law exacts of every agent the utmost fidelity to his principal. He 
must keep him fully informed as to all his transactions, and the state 
of the business or interests entrusted to him. Any departure from these 
rules is a fraud in law. An agent to sell cannot become the purchaser, 
and an agent to buy cannot be himself the seller. Equity removes 
from the trustee every temptation to violate his trust by declaring in 
advance that all such transactions are null and void at the option of 
the principal[.]255 
If a tenant representative in the employ, and working under the 
brokerage license, of a large, full-service CRES firm shows his 
prospective tenant client a commercial space in which that brokerage firm 
has a direct or indirect ownership interest, and makes no disclosures 
whatsoever to that tenant client regarding such ownership conflict of 
interest, the brokerage firm, if not the tenant representative himself, would 
benefit economically from the negotiation and execution of a lease of the 
premises through that tenant representative. Under these facts, it seems 
clear that an actionable conflict of interest claim under the common law 
principles of principal and agent should exist, especially given the specific 
prohibitions enunciated in Justice Talmadge’s dissenting opinion. 
Yet by superseding the common law of agency and its attendant 
fiduciary duties, the Washington Legislature has made it far more difficult 
to remedy an undisclosed conflict of interest. Certainly, Revised Code of 
Washington section 18.86 created a statutory duty requiring disclosure of 
conflicts, but it did not provide any remedies. Instead, injured tenants must 
rely on theories of tort and the CPA for relief, each type of claim with its 
own distinct challenges and hurdles, as discussed above. 
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This conflict of interest exists in an environment where commercial 
tenants may not be especially sophisticated and be able to understand the 
ramifications of dual agency and the attendant conflicts.256 Rather it is a 
common misconception that commercial tenants are sophisticated, a point 
that was emphasized during California’s discussion of Senate Bill 1171 in 
2014: 
There is a common misconception that parties involved in 
commercial real estate transactions are (1) sophisticated; (2) of equal 
bargaining power; or (3) equally knowledgeable and experienced in 
real estate as the other party or the brokers involved. This is not 
always the case. For example, a small business owner whose only 
real estate transaction over the next five years will be his/her office 
lease is not going to be as sophisticated as a landlord whose primary 
business is real estate and who is negotiating multiple leases a year 
with the help of a team of sophisticated professionals. That business 
owner is at a severe disadvantage at the bargaining table and should 
be educated on the duties or limited duties the licensed real estate 
professionals involved in the transaction owe to all parties.257 
Given this potential significant lack of sophistication, commercial 
tenants are severely underserved by the current tort and CPA claims 
offered in Washington law. Compare these, often difficult to pursue, 
claims with the previous standard discussed in Merksy where such an 
undisclosed conflict would amount to fraud in law, with no requirement to 
show knowledge or intent. Even though there are many statutory parallels 
between a broker’s common law duties “to conduct [oneself] in a way free 
of bad faith, dishonesty, or untrustworthiness,”258 enforcement of these 
duties has been made much more difficult. 
It is clear that Revised Code of Washington section 18.86 eroded 
protections tenants previously enjoyed under the common law. With the 
difficulties of pursuing claims under the CPA or in tort, tenants can only 
be fully protected by prohibiting the practice of dual agency in commercial 
real estate transactions in Washington. And, tenants can only fully be 
protected by reinstating to its full extent the common law of agency in 
these transactions. 
CONCLUSION 
In retrospect, and after examining carefully in this Article the 
common law duties an agent owes its principal, and the legislative history 
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and subsequent interpretation by the courts of Revised Code of 
Washington section 18.86, it is incomprehensible why the Washington 
State Legislature enacted a licensure scheme to regulate commercial real 
estate brokers and, in the process, supplanted the well-established and 
long-standing common law duties agents owe their principals, thereby 
substantially weakening the protections principals, such as prospective 
tenants, previously had against various forms of harmful conduct by 
commercial property brokers. The legislature repeatedly, following the 
initial enactment of HB 1659 in 1996, amended the statutory provisions of 
Revised Code of Washington section 18.86, further weakening the already 
limited statutory protections. Those subsequent amendments, offered 
under the pretext of providing needed “clarifications” of the original 
language, rendered the entire scheme almost meaningless in the context of 
dual agency; marginalizing and, to some extent, completely undermining 
the duties a tenant representative owes to a prospective tenant of 
commercial space. These changes raise a number of questions about the 
true motivations underpinning their substance and timing; more than a 
mere inference of favoring the commercial brokerage industry generally, 
and full-service CRES firms in particular, may be drawn from the legal 
research and analysis presented in this Article. 
The damage done—leaving aggrieved tenants without adequate 
recourse against unscrupulous and self-serving practices through dual 
agency by full-service CRES firms, as perpetrated by their tenant 
representatives—may still be reversed, at least for prospective participants 
in these transactions. The best—and only adequate—way to fully and 
properly protect commercial tenants from unfair advantages enjoyed by 
landlords through their commercial brokers is to prohibit altogether the 
practice of dual agency in commercial real estate transactions and restore 
fully all of the protections previously afforded tenants under the common 
law of principal and agent in the commercial real estate transaction 
context. At the bare minimum, the practice of dual agency in commercial 
real estate transactions must be stopped. Otherwise, we risk continuing to 
subordinate the expectations and interests of commercial tenants in favor 
of full-service CRES firms and their commercial landlord clients. 
